依會計盈餘時效性設計高階主管薪酬契約：董事會所扮演的角色

The Design of Top Executive Compensation Contracts Based on the Timeliness of Accounting Earnings: The Role of the Board of Directors

本研究旨在探討依會計盈餘時效性設計之高階主管薪酬契約，是否和董事會有效性（或稱董事會誘因融合度）具有關聯性。董事會依循股東利益加以評估、監督管理者之能力愈強及誘因愈大，則董事會有效性（或董事會誘因融合度）愈高。本研究預期，當董事會有效性愈高，其設計的總經理誘因契約較會依據盈餘時效性來決定盈餘的薪酬權數，俾驅使總經理在決定努力水準時，將本期行動對公司價值當期及未來各期的全部影響皆考慮在內，避免作成短視的決策。本研究以國內上市公司為樣本進行分析，實證結果發現，董事會有效性愈高，則盈餘時效性和高階主管薪酬－盈餘敏感度間的正向關係愈強。此結果支持本研究之預測，顯示董事會誘因融合度愈高時，較能設計誘因一致的管理者薪酬契約，進而降低代理問題。

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the effectiveness of the board(or the degree of director incentive alignment)is associated with the design of top executive compensation contracts based on the timeliness of earnings. This study refers to the extent to which a board of directors exhibits characteristics consistent with the ability and incentive to monitor and evaluate top management in the interests of the firm's shareholders as the degree of board's effectiveness or director incentive alignment. This paper predicts that when the degree of director incentive alignment is higher, the incentive weight on earnings is more likely to embed the timeliness of earnings to capture dynamic aspects of the marginal product of current period action not captured by current period earnings. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, this study finds that the positive relation between measures of earnings timeliness and measures of executive compensation-earnings sensitivity are significantly stronger as the board's effectiveness increases. This result supports the prediction that the more effective board would design more incentive-aligned executive compensation contracts to mitigate the managerial moral hazard problem.