黃光國難題的誤區：由案例反思儒家倫理療癒

Misunderstanding the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem: An Introspection on Confucian Ethical Therapy Based on a Case Studies

黃光國主張「中體西用」固然有其道理，然其「體」不能是「中國固有的倫理道德」，如果說「中體」是個「先驗架構」，該架構只能是具有自性意義的「心體」，才能離開黃光國難題的觀念誤區，避免倫理因脫離相應的時空背景產生對人的傷害。本文覺得黃光國主張的「儒家倫理療癒理論」並未獲得成熟發展，其主張充滿著各種「質性跳躍」的內涵，本意旨在藉由生命內省、公共政策、學校教育與社會工作來重構儒家倫理，藉此完成人的療癒，問題並不僅在黃光國徵引的存在三種反思具有混淆性，關鍵更在其太重視傳統儒家的「絕對倫理」，導致壓迫人性的事情被合理化，且既有的「相對倫理」只侷限於私領域彼此相識的人情關係，甚至會將本該屬於公領域的倫理都全面轉型成私人關係，卻沒有仔細著墨公領域（群己關係）該有的倫理，這對於發展儒家倫理療癒實有不利。本文觀察與徵引各種經由黃光國討論的案例，都可經由反思發現這類因為觀念未清導致的倫理困境。因此，本文提出具體辦法：宣布破除兩漢時期已經過時的「絕對倫理」對集體潛意識的影響，避免再發生任何不同程度的倫理霸凌；說明「相對倫理」現在只能侷限於私領域，作為對公領域的搭配，仔細釐清相關的責任與義務，使其與社會實況相互符應；強調華人社會應該設立新的「公五倫」（賢，能，法，智，利），發展內蘊「兩輪同行」意義的儒家倫理，讓公私兩領域平衡發展。如果我們覺得華人社會長期深受儒家思想影響，具有倫理本位，每個人都置身於各種不同的倫理關係中，因此倫理療癒其實有替整個社會各層面釐訂其座標的意義，基於完成這種具有廣義範圍的倫理療癒，筆者對儒家倫理有三點修訂主張，希冀藉此完成具有真實意義的倫理療癒。

The Needham Problem (why did modern science develop only in Europe and not China) was raised in the context of the early increasing socioeconomic development of China. A similar observation, ＂China has technology but not science＂, has become a common saying. Recently the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem, it means how to make Chinese ideas about the unity of heaven and human not disappear, and to dialogue with Western ideas about the opposition between subject and object, and develop a modern Chinese indigenous social science, which poses the question of how to complete a paradigm shift in social science research methodology, emerged as an alternative to the Needham Problem rather than a solution to it. China has rid itself of political and economic colonization. The next issue is how to be rid of academic colonization. This is particularly important when discussing the topic of psychotherapy. We cannot ignore the psychological impact of culture on people. Chinese thinking encompasses the unity between Heaven and humanity. It emphasizes the experiences of life. Modern science entails speculation about subject-object relationships. How to use the language of subject-object separation to accurately discuss subject-object integration is a major challenge in developing autonomous Chinese scholarship. The complexity lies in integrating the essence of Chinese culture, which has the ideological tradition of unity between Heaven and humanity, in order to reach the Western process of opposition between Heaven and humanity. In other words, the question is how to integrate the micro world of the philosophy of science that developed from the life world by understanding and clarifying the philosophy of science and accomplishing creative interpretation of the Chinese indigenous social sciences. I explore this process in this article by clarifying a misunderstanding of the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem, and reflecting on Confucian ethical healing through case studies. I also address responses by Hwang Kwang-Kuo himself. There are wrong views in Hwang Kwang-Kuo's propositions. They are not necessarily caused by blind spots of personal thinking. Even if there is such a dilemma, it is mainly the unity between Heaven and humanity in Chinese thought, and the opposition between Heaven and humanity in Western philosophy that leads to a dilemma of conflicting ideas in thought and philosophy. I discuss Hwang's research blind spots and the misunderstanding of his work. I provide a way to eliminate the loopholes in Hwang Kwang-Kuo's textual thinking in order to approach the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem and look for breakthrough points to open up a new opportunity for Chinese indigenous social science. Hwang Kwang-Kuo's claim that Chinese learning is for fundamentals and Western learning is for application is reasonable, but Chinese learning for fundamentals can't be the inherent ethics of China. If we regard Chinese learning for fundamentals as prior architecture, the architecture can only be nous with its own nature and significance so as to avoid misunderstanding the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem and harming people due to ethical departure from the corresponding space-time background. I argue that Hwang Kwang-Kuo's claim of Confucian ethical therapy theory is not mature enough and full of various qualitative leaps. Its original intention is to reconstruct Confucian ethics based on life introspection, public policy, school education, and social work to heal people. However, the problem is not only the confusion of the three kinds of reflection in Kwang-Kuo Hwang's claim, but also his attaching great importance to the absolute ethics of traditional Confucianism, which allows the oppression of humanity to be rationalized. Relative ethics are only applied in the personal relationship domain. Public ethics are fully transformed into personal relationships, but people pay little attention to public ethics (group-self relationship), which is not beneficial to the development of Confucian ethical therapy. I cite a variety of cases discussed by Hwang Kwang-Kuo in which an ethical dilemma is caused by the lack of a clear conceptualization through reflection. I propose specific measures in this paper: eliminate the collective unconsciousness influence of absolute ethics during the Western and Eastern Han period to avoid any ethical bullying; declare that relative ethics can only be confined to the private domain as a collocation of the public field, and carefully clarify the relevant responsibilities and obligations so as to meet the mutual benefits of the social reality; emphasize that Chinese society should set up a new ＂5 public ethical principles＂ (worthiness, ability, law, wisdom, interest) and develop a two-wheeled Confucian ethics to achieve balanced development in the public and private fields. Chinese society is deeply influenced by Confucianism and has its own ethical standards. Everyone has a variety of ethical relationships, so ethical therapy can have great significance for setting the coordinates for people throughout society. On the basis of completing this ethical therapy with a broad scope, I offer a 3-point revision of Confucian ethics, and hope to develop an ethical therapy of true meaning.