英文摘要 |
This article provides a detailed review of the perspective presented in the books Indigenous Social Science and The Subjective Argument of the Confucian Cultural System by Hwang Kwang-Kuo in order to clarify the philosophy of science Hwang used to support his arguments. In fact, we discovered that the hollow structure of Hwang's "Multiple philosophical paradigms" have nothing to do with any fictionality the original purpose of Hwang's books was to address the philosophical paradigms relevant to realism in order to explore the research method of relationalism. The Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem is the question of how to complete a paradigm shift in social science research methodology. I point out that Hwang's argument reflects the fundamental nature and methodology of philosophy and may not be related to realism at all. Hwang's argument cannot facilitate the bidirectional circulation of the life world and the micro world as Hwang claimed. Hwang aimed to explore the structure of the human mind, but structural thought is not equivalent to structuralism. I oppose Hwang's idea that structuralism is at the center of multiple philosophic paradigms. I believe that the problem with constructive realism is that it discusses realism without discussing realism, and that the problem of critical realism is that it is a discussion of realism that differs from realism. Both forms of realism avoid discussing realism itself. Neither responds to Chinese culture, which has an intellectual tradition that supports the idea that humans are an integral part of nature. Neither can support construction of indigenous social sciences in Chinese societies. If the basis for applying realism as an answer to the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem is validated by the argument that no previous ideologies are appropriate, I would rather return to nousism. Chinese thought develop a realism that is completely different from idealism and materialism. For Chinese thought, the controversy between idealism and materialism is meaningless, because the origin of the universe is not in ideal and material, but in the nous. It is a long research tradition and thinking style, so that I use "nousism" to call the study of the inner world of human mind. Starting there, constructive realism and critical realism can be re-evaluated with linguistic strangification so that both ideologies are understood to pertain not only to the soul, but also to the body. The micro worlds of the body and soul can be constructed, and various types of micro worlds can be integrated to develop a more sophisticated "constructed realism". Only then can the ontological strangification be consolidated. I apply the logical structure of transcendental arguments and beliefs to argue that the objective of studying Heaven and humans is neither the phenomenology of empiricism nor a construction that humans place on phenomena. An independently operating and continuously existing structure of realism lies just beyond human knowledge. The nature of the ego is to connect with Heaven. Where social habits can be ignored, the ego can return to its nature. When humans connect with Heaven it creates a phenomenon beyond the physical. People may possess not only six senses, but also ālayavijñāna (alaya consciousness) with the self. Truth comes from truth, which ultimately comes from the unity of Heaven and humans. This argument answers the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem, and also Needham's Problem. I propose that Hwang Kwang-Kuo's perspective on spiritual realism and historical realism inclines towards subjectivism as both realisms are geared towards nous. Since nous has the characteristic of Heaven and humans united as one, then humans and Heaven would originally have been conceptualized spiritually with natural flow and communication, and corporally as the self-transformation of the ego. This nature is more precisely labeled "intersubjectivity". If life is faced through self-nous and people can have their own insight into Heaven, relations, objects, and the self as they co-exist in their lives, then they develop a variety of I-thou relations. In response to the assertion that it is dangerous to value nous in an empirical life, I note that the nousism of Chinese thought is not the idealism and materialism of Western philosophy. If the nous is neither too familiar nor too distant from experience, then it should be able to go beyond experience to yield a corresponding experience. If people respect and accept the existence of deities (arising from traditional customs), but feel that it is a problem to admit the existence of nous (arising from traditional academics), it is a double standard. Hwang Kwang-Kuo provided an argument for how to complete a paradigm shift in social science research methodology. When scholars directly rethink the definition of science and accept the idea that systematic is scientific, and provide rigorous arguments for the presuppositions of indigenous social science, they create a scientific micro world. Confucianism has long been making spiritual issues into academic ones by converting faith for God into a study of the self. Confucianism is not the mere task of understanding culture in the process of human growth, but of seeking the common source idea behind different religious teachings. This cross-religious discussion places rationality in conscience. Only because the original reconciliation and symbiosis of human civilization was beneficial did Chinese thought become the thought of East Asia. If scholars continue to explore its modern significance, there is an opportunity to develop Chinese thought into a more mature Chinese indigenous social science. If scholars can then accurately relate different cultures by understanding them correctly, academic contents can become universal knowledge. |