債權物權化與類型法定原則

“Propertization of Obligatory Rights”and the Principle of Numerus Clausus

我國學理上所稱的「債權物權化」，應係指系爭債權突破相對性的原則，而具有「外部保護」的第三人效力，藉以對抗特定的妨礙行為。由於賦予債權保護的手段多端，因此債權物權化的法律效果不一而足，原則上係屬立法者的形成空間。又應注意者，「債權的第三人效力」與「物權的第三人效力」之間，其理論基礎與法律效果均不相同。換言之，「物權化」一詞，僅是用以指涉系爭債權具有「對抗第三人的效力外觀」，但實則與「物權」無涉。物權法上諸多原則與規定，從而並無適用餘地。至於債權物權化的範圍，本文主張「緩和的類型法定原則」。對債之關係當事人而言，基於私法自治原則，其不得自行創設債權的第三人效力。對審判法院而言，有鑑於基本權對於司法者的拘束效力，受訴法院僅得在「適用與類推適用」的範圍內，在個案中肯認系爭債權的第三人效力。因此，物權化的類型與範圍，均應以法律規定及其制度目的為依歸。

The article talks about the meaning of the so-called“propertization of obligatory rights (Verdinglichung obligatorischer Rechte)”and its scope. The term“propertization of obligatory rights”is used to describe that the obligation develops unusually a legal relationship between the creditor and the third party, which is contrary to the doctrine of privity. The“abnormalities”, such as“sale does not break lease”and“covenant to use co-owned property”, are aimed at protecting the particular obligation against the certain interference from the third party. The means of protection is so diverse that the consequence of the“propertization of obligatory rights”can be also very varied, which is a piece of legislation. The propertized obligatory rights remain as“in personam rights”, despite the fact that the third party is bound by these obligations, which is seen as one of the distinguishing features of“in rem rights (dingliches Recht)”. But their theoretical bases and consequences differ from each other. Therefore, the principles of the property law such as principle of numerus clausus (in property law) do not apply to the“propertized obligatory rights”. When it comes to the scope of“propertization of obligatory rights”, this article contends the principle of“mild numerus clausus (milder Typenzwang)”, under which the legislature monopolizes the creation of propertization forms, but the analogical extension of statutory provisions is, in contrast to Article 757 of the Taiwan Civil Code, not prohibited. On the one hand, according to the private autonomy, it cannot be up to the parties of the obligation to create a new form of“propertized obligatory rights”. On the other hand, the“brand-new”propertization can also not to be created by the judges. The restriction is not only due to the legal methodology but also due to the fundamental rights, which is protected from the state interference, including the judiciary. But this does not forbid law analogy in the unprovided cases. Therefore, the uncodified propertization of the obligatory right can be, and can only be, accepted, when a“gap”exists in a similar case.