再探東北亞安全──東海海洋爭端的和平解決

Revisited Northeast Asia Security: Peace Resolution of East China Sea Disputes

東北亞是世界上許多最為複雜領土爭端之地。雖然爭端的領土並非涵蓋某特定國家的全部領土，但卻持續造成國家之間的緊張關係。甚至難以居住的海中島嶼，亦可能造成高度爆炸性的爭端焦點。2005年年初，東海成為一個激烈爭端之地。本文將思考東海爭端中可能加以管理及或許最終解決的兩種情節。首種情節是理想的情境。本文假設委託諸如在海牙的國際法院、在漢堡的海洋法庭從事解決爭端的工作，亦即透過一種公正的外部機構，而且所有相關國家願意接受該機構的決定。然而，基於一些原因，諸如台灣的地位問題、中國和其他國家對外部干預的反對，以及公平界定的可能十分困難，從而該情節似乎難以出現。然而該情節仍有一定的價值，因為其或許能指出一些前進的參考。第二種情節則更為現實，本文假設一種自利、功能的途徑，在管理以及最終解決爭端中享有重要的過渡性角色。

Northeast Asia is home to many of the world's most vexing territorial disputes. The territories in dispute need not cover the entire soil of a particular country in order to seriously strain interstate relationships. Even barely habitable offshore islands can serve as the most explosive bone of contention. In early 2005, the East China Sea (ECS) became a hotly-disputed area. In this paper will present two scenarios for how the dispute in the ECS could be managed and perhaps eventually resolved. The first scenario is idealistic. This paper assume that an impartial, external body, such as the International Court of Justice in the Hague, the new Law of the Sea Tribunal in Hamburg, or a great power conference, is entrusted with the task of resolving the dispute, and that all interested states are willing to accept its decisions. For several reasons (notably the unresolved status of Taiwan, China's and other states' opposition to external interference, and the mere impossibility of impartiality), this scenario is never going to happen. It is still of some interest, since it may point out some ways forward. The second scenario is more realistic. Instead of assuming that an impartial external body takes the decisions on behalf of the regional states, this paper assume that a self-interested, enlightened Chinese government assumes a leading role in managing and eventually resolving the dispute.