家族傳承之股權安排──以公司法特別股之多元化為中心

Shareholding Arrangement forFamily Business Succession–Preferred Shares Diversification ofTaiwan’s Company Act

避免股權分散及經營權旁落為家族企業傳承計畫的重要環節，實務上亦有多種傳承安排可供選擇。本文限於篇幅，僅就2018年公司法修正條文中，關於特別股多元化之改革加以探討：首先，本文比較在新法下，「閉鎖性股份有限公司」及一般非公開發行之股份有限公司所得發行之特別股，類型規範上有何異同；其次分別說明複數表決權股、黃金股以及董事席次之安排，對家族企業之治理及傳承所生之影響，並就現行法之侷限及未臻完善之處，探討以特別股作為家族傳承之工具時，所需審慎規劃之要點，避免具有優先權利之特別股日後反成為家族企業經營之阻礙。最後，本文以公司治理之導向，說明家族企業採用特別股之控制權機制時，可能產生之代理成本，並自受託義務之角度，探討擁有經營權之家族成員未盡受託義務而致僅享有受益權之其他家族成員受有損害時，應負之責任。本文期望藉由以上之探討，提供家族企業因應特別股多元化之芻議，以及立法者未來修法之思考方向。

Family businesses usually care about how to avoid shareholding dispersionand takeover of management very much. In practice, a variety ofarrangements could be chosen to facilitate family business succession.However, this article only focused on the reform of preferred shares diversificationunder the 2018 amendment of Taiwan’s Company Act. First, thisarticle compared the legal types of preferred shares between “close companies”and general non-public companies. Furthermore, it discussed howthe arrangement of multiple voting right shares, golden shares and directors’seats would impact on corporate governance and family business succession.As to the limitations and imperfect improvements of the currentlaw, this article also highlighted the necessity to avoid the preferred shareswith priority rights becoming a hindrance to family business operations inthe future. Finally, based on the modern principles of corporate governance,this article explained that preferred shareholder control might giverise to potential agency costs in certain circumstances. It also examined whether the working children (preferred shareholders with controllingrights) owe fiduciary duties to the non-working children (shareholderswithout controlling rights) in a family business. It is expected that this articlewould help family businesses to response to the preferred shares diversificationproperly and provide legislators some notions for future legalreforms in Taiwan.