英文摘要 |
The amendment of the Law on Grand Justices’ Adjudication of cases is intended not so much to further judicialization of the institution of constitutional interpretation, but to enhance the density and systematization of its procedural rules. This reform also tries to improve the efficiency by lifting outdated barriers. The quorum rule is thus changed from 2/3 majority to simple majority. But another problem with the formality of judgment, including the verdict and its reasoning, is neglected. The extension of Grand Justices’ reviewing power from norms to individual case judgments not only induces serious crowding out effect to its core functions, but also twists the basic division of work between Grand Justices and the other Highest Courts. On the other hand the new legislation has underestimated the cost of delay to redress unconstitutional laws, leaving the rigid rule of exhaustion of court instances untouched. |