公營事業部分民營化後公股股權之管理──論政府股東於民營化事業的公司治理角色

The Administration of Government Ownership after the Partial Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises: The Corporate Governance Role of Government Shareholders in Privatized Enterprises

我國公營事業民營化實務經常採取部分民營化的作法，引發了政府股東在公營事業民營化以後應該扮演如何的公司治理角色以管理其持有的剩餘公股股權的問題。本文回顧我國現行關於公營事業民營化的相關公司治理規定，發現現行行政院及相關部會的相關要點高度強調公股代表對政府股東負有維護公股權益的義務，並且賦予政府股東對公股代表的高度指揮控制力，但對於政府股東相對應的義務與責任，相關要點並未理清。本文進而從比較公司治理理論出發，說明在公營事業實質民營化而將經營權由政府轉移至民間經營階層後，主要的公司治理問題，在於如何防止民間經營階層從事利益輸送行為圖利自己而損及事業乃至事業其他股東的利益，就此政府股東應扮演監督者的角色，制衡民間經營階層的利益輸送行為。在此理論基礎之上，本文進一步探討現行公司法制應如何落實上開理論，以課予政府股東上開監督責任。本文在回顧公司法第8條第3項引入的事實上董事與影子董事以及法院實務發展的實質董事後，主張實質民營化事業的政府股東至少應構成實質董事，而依公司法第23條第1項與第193條，對民營化事業負擔忠實義務與注意義務，且此義務除適用於政府股東實質行使董事職權的場合外，尚可能進一步適用於政府股東行使其股東權的場合──例如行使表決權時，就此，臺灣證券交易所近年頒布的機構投資人盡職治理守則當中關於機構投資人應如何行使其表決權所揭示的相關原則，可作為政府股東善盡其義務時的行為準則參考。透過上述分析，本文試圖釐清政府股東在實質民營化事業應扮演的監督者角色，以及如何應用現行公司法制達成此一目的。

When privatizing state-owned enterprises, Taiwan’s government often adopts partial privatization. This raises the issue of how the government shareholder should play its corporate governance role to administer its residual government ownership. In this article, after reviewing the current regulations related to the corporate governance of privatized enterprises, I find that the related rules issued by the Executive Yuan and related ministries highly emphasize the duty of government representatives owed to the government shareholder to protect the interest of government ownership and the tremendous control power vested to the government shareholder over government representatives. In contrast, in respect of the corresponding obligations and duties of government shareholders, the related rules do not provide a clear clue. I thus approach this issue from a corporate governance theory perspective in order to identify the major corporate governance problem after the government conducts a substantive privatization of state-owned enterprises and transfers its managerial power to private management. I identify the major problem as how to prevent private managements from tunneling the interest to themselves and hurting the interests of the enterprises and their other shareholders. On this, government shareholders should play the monitoring role to check and balance the tunneling from private managements.
On the basis of this theory, I further revisit how the current corporate laws can implement the above theory so as to impose the above monitoring duty on government shareholders. After revisiting the concepts of de facto directors and shadow directors introduced by Article 8 Paragraph 3 of the Company Act and the substantive directors developed in the court practice, I propose that government shareholders in a substantively privatized enterprises should at least constitute substantive directors and owe the duties of loyalty and care to privatized enterprises in accordance with Article 23 Paragraph 1 and Article 193 of the Company Act. Furthermore, these duties not only apply when a government shareholder de facto exercises the power of directors; they also apply when a government shareholder exercises its power of shareholders, such as exercising its voting power. On this, the Stewardship Code issued by the Taiwan Stock Exchange, which provides for the principles for institutional investors to exercise their voting power, can serve a guidance for government shareholders to perform their duties. Through the above analyses, I attempt to clarify the monitoring role to be played by government shareholders in the privatized enterprises and how the current corporate laws can be applied to achieve the said objective.