英文摘要 |
This article provides an analysis and an evaluation of significant institutional and functional changes of the Constitutional Court since October 1, 2003. Institutional changes include issues such as whether the President and Vice-President of the Judicial Yuan should also serve as justices of the Constitutional Court, the transformation from the Grand Justices Council to the Constitutional Court, the number of the justices and the length of their term, and whether the justices are judges under Article 80 of the Constitution. Functional changes consist of the role of the Constitutional Court in protecting human rights, the increase in numbers of dissenting and concurring opinions, and the increased persuasiveness of the constitutional interpretations. Setting the Court in the new developments, this article suggests three challenges lie ahead: the fact that President and Vice-President of the Judicial Yuan do not enjoy a fixed term of office, the Constitutional Court as a collegiate body, and the efficiency of rendering constitutional interpretations. The article concludes that the Constitutional Court will better function if justices pay heed to both the quality and efficiency of their interpretations, to the role of their individual opinions, and to judicial collegiality. |