自由主義與審議式民主的公民教育

Liberalism and the Civic Education of Deliberative Democracy

自由主義是一套支撐民主體制的政治理論，其主張的中立原則，強調民主公民的教育不該影響個體私人領域的價值形塑。但近年民主研究出現審議式轉向，公民被要求積極投入公共政策的討論和制定。本研究指出，審議式民主的公民教育，與傳統的代議政制有所分別，作為積極的公民參與形式，它對公民的政治素養和德性皆有更高的要求。自由主義礙於中立原則，卻未能就公民性格、公共參與倫理、政治參與的價值定位等議題適時調整，以配合民主教育的理論和實踐轉變。本研究從規範性的視角出發，分析當代自由主義與審議式民主就公民教育之間的理論張力。透過審視John Rawls的政治自由主義，本研究對自由主義提出內部批評，指出Rawls的政治人的觀念，要求公民具有強烈的道德關懷和正義感，實在需要修正為具嚴謹倫理要求的道德人觀念。本研究因此論證，自由主義需要重新詮釋政治的道德、政治人觀念和中立性原則，重返倫理式自由主義的框架，以回應自身的理論證成。本研究指出，Rawls的理論在修訂後，可導引出一種符合審議式民主教育的政治理論，自由主義有其理論資源回應積極公民參與的理論要求，並為正義理論和公民教育理論提供理想人格設定。

As the underlying political theory for democratic institutions, Liberalism claims to uphold the neutrality principle which does not attempt to involve value shaping upon individuals. Yet, recent emergence of deliberative turn in democratic studies required citizens to actively participate in policy formation. In this context, this paper argues that civic education of deliberative democracy differs from the traditional representative model, as active citizenship requires a higher level of political virtues and mentality from citizens. Liberalism, in upholding the neutrality principle, could not address the demanding requirements of imposing civic personality, ethics of civic participation, and account of values for political participation in its framework of democratic education. This paper gives an account of the theoretical tension between liberalism and deliberative democracy in the context of civic education from a normative perspective. Through reviewing John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, an internal critique of liberalism is provided, thus arguing that the idea of the political conception of the person literally imposes citizens with robust moral commitment and sense of justice. An ethically demanding interpretation of the moral person in his theory is required. In order to complete the theoretical justification of political liberalism itself, this paper then argues for the need to reinterpret the ideas of political morality, political conception of the person, the neutrality principle, and bring its framework back to a version of ethical liberalism. In light of such interpretation, this paper argues that Rawls’s theory could become the background theory for deliberative civic education. To respond to those challenges brought by deliberative democracy in a similar vein, this paper also illustrates that liberalism is able to stand for the making of ideal civic personhood for both theories of justice and citizenship education.