從永豐金案看獨立董事制度

Analyzing the System of Independent Directors from the Sinopac Case

本文自探討永豐金弊案發生的原因，分析我國獨立董事制度為何迄今功能有限。永豐金弊案顯示金融機構三道防線關關失守，獨立董事乃至審計委員會也未發揮應有功能。考量永豐金弊案非近年金融業單一事故，應存在結構性問題。本文因限於篇幅，專注討論獨立董事制度之立法設計。總的來說，我國公司法董事會負責執行業務，因此內部組織趨向權力集中，以強化業務經營效率。在業務型董事會，插入以監控為主的獨立董事或審計委員會，不但理論上產生自己監控自己的矛盾，實務上監控機關也難以和強勢的董事長，以及掌控整個經營階層的內部董事抗衡。另一障礙是獨立董事的工作內容及行為準繩混沌不明，如何履行職務、拿捏分寸除了需有明確標準外，包括權責設計、同儕／後勤支援，例如緩衝者角色等等都不可或缺。令人振奮的是，社會、文化以及科技的發展，都朝向有利於獨立董事運作的方向。因此，藉由永豐金弊案的檢討，若能根本上改善法規設計，輔以配套措施，獨立董事之建置應可大幅提升我國企業的治理水準。

This article will analyze the cause for independent directors’ limited functions by discussing the SinoPac case, which manifests the malfunction of independent directors, audit committee and the three defense lines of financial institutions. Considering that SinoPac case is not the only case in recent years, there must exist a structural issue. Due to the length restriction, this article will focus on the legislative design of independent directors. Generally speaking, the board of directors is responsible of business management, therefore, internal organization is centralized to reinforce the efficiency. Adding independent directors or audit committee into a management board will lead to a “self-supervision” dilemma and these supervisory units may not be able to compete with Chairman and internal directors. Another obstacle results from the opaqueness of independent directors’ work scope and code of conducts since clear standards for their work performance, design of authority and responsibility as well as logistics and peer support are all necessary. However, developments in society, culture and technology are evolving into a direction that benefits independent directors’ operation. Thus, if we can improve the regulatory design and supplemental measures after examining the SinoPac case, the implementation of independent directors may largely enhance the quality of corporate governance.