不同競爭行為下的產業內授權決策

The Analysis of Inside Licensing Under Differentiated Competitve Behavior

本文設立一雙占模型，討論不同猜測變量下，專利擁有者的授權行為。考慮專利擁 有者授權後仍與被授權廠商在產品市場進行數量競爭的假設下，本文得到：第一、在非劇烈創新且市場越不競爭時，授權廠商越可能以固定權利金授權。第二、考慮廠商間的 競爭程度後，若授權廠商以單位權利金授權，其最適單位權利金可能小於授權前後的成 本差距。

This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate the licensing behavior of inside licensors under different competitive relationships with its competitor; a conjectural variations approach is employed. Assuming that both the licensor and licensee engage in a quantitative competition in the same industry after licensing, we obtain the following results. First, the less competitive a market with a non-drastic innovation, the more likely the licensor would prefer a fixed-fee licensing to a royalty licensing. Second, considering the magnitude of ompetition between firms, the optimal royalty rate could be smaller than the cost reduction after licensing when the licensor is responsible for selecting a royalty licensing regime.