英文摘要 |
This article aims to exam the argumentations on whether to establish union strike notice under the current Taiwan labor law regime. The debates over this issue focused mainly on the necessity of requiring union conduct further notice before the actual strike commences. The supporting argument points out that the general public deserves a clue of the industrial action to refrain themselves from the uncertainty. The refuting points of view, however, believe that the strike notice is inappropriate due to the unbalance negotiating power between the employer and the union. Furthermore, it emphasizes that by following the multiple legal pre-requirements to conduct a legal strike, the action itself already constitutes a pretty strong“de facto strike notice”to the employer and the general public.To shed light on this particular debate and lead to a complete discussion, the author believes the answer to the prospects of the union strike notice should not rest on a“right or wrong answer”, but a“multiple choice portfolio.”This paper suggests that a proper union strike notice, from the inspiration of the U.S. labor law, should weight the balance between the employer and the union with the ideology of fair economic weapon. Thestrike notice should, moreover, capable of bringing out the“semi-strike effect,”which can stimulate the economic pressure of the actual strike and urge the conflicting parties to compromise voluntarily, as the actual strike may do. An adequately designed strike notice rule can also serve the general public’s demand on prior notification of the industrial action without jeopardizing the negotiating parties.The research concludes with a bill of union strike notice for the Taiwan society. It is not the author’s intention to advocate the strike notice amendment, but to utilize the bill to trigger more discussions among different augmentations. Hopefully, this article could be a fundamental reference for future related studies and bring out further dialogue regards to this debate. |