攻擊－防禦理論、空權發展與台海穩定

Offense-Defense Theory, Air Power and The Stability of Taiwan Strait

攻擊－防禦理論（offense-defense theory）主張當攻擊佔優勢時戰爭是較可能的，而當防禦佔優勢時較能夠避免戰爭。在特定條件之下，若防禦具有優勢，則有助於減低衝突與緊張。而科技的演變，特別是空權的發展減低了防禦的優勢，因此在台灣產生了轉守為攻的主張。然而本文主張，空權並未嚴重削弱台灣的防禦優勢。首先，空權的攻擊力被高估，空襲並不易一舉摧毀敵空軍於地面，也不易透過對於指揮管制中心的攻擊而癱瘓敵軍行動。此外有效的空襲有賴數量龐大的戰機與充足的精確導引武器供應，並非一般國家財力所能負擔。而檢視1991年波斯灣戰爭地面戰的過程亦發現，制空權喪失並非伊軍的失敗的主因。而純粹以空權獨立屈服敵人，亦為曠日廢時，緩不濟急之法。因此，台灣並不需要改變防衛固守的策略。

Offense-defense theory claimed when offense has the advantage, wars are more likely; when defense has the advantage, wars are less likely. The evolution of technology, especially the development of air power has made defense less easily, so there are increasing opinions argue that Taiwan should change the defensive orientation to an offensive one. However, this article argues that the development of air power does not greatly reduce the advantage of defense. First, the offensive power of air raid has been overestimated; it is quite difficult to destroy all of the opponent's aircrafts on the ground. It is also very difficult to disable opponent's forces by attacking opponent's command & control centers. Furthermore, an offensive air campaign needs a large air force and sufficient munitions; it is not affordable for a normal country. The land battle of 1991 Gulf War also shows that air power has little to do on the outcome of the land battle. Finally, using strategic bombing as a coercive strategy is very time-consuming. Therefore, Taiwan should not change the defensive strategy.