惟遙睇箕子舊封：論明廷對「丙子之役」的情報判斷與決策

On the Ming's Judgment and Decision-making about the Intelligence of the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea

崇 禎九年 （1636） ，清朝 入侵朝 鮮，史 稱「丙子 之 役」。戰役爆發伊始，明廷即收到遼東塘報並有所警覺。隨 著遼東「走回人」提供的口供和謠言增加，明廷判斷受到干 擾而保守觀望。毗鄰朝鮮本土、負責收集傳遞朝鮮情報的東 江鎮皮島始終未見塘報。明廷下令皮島援鮮後不久，便傳來 朝鮮投降的消息，皮島後被清朝和朝鮮聯軍順勢攻陷。明廷 的「缺席」是左右丙子之役戰局的關鍵因素。由於情報收集 的差池，明廷既未能即時援助朝鮮也貽失對清後方襲擾的戰 機，不僅失去屬國朝鮮，遼東要塞皮島也被攻陷，致使明廷 在遼東戰場上愈發被動。

At the beginning of the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea (丙子 之役) in 1636, the Ming Court received intelligence from Liaodong and was therefore alert. Considering the confessions and rumors provided by Zouhui-ren (走回人) in Liaodong, and the fact that Pi Island of the Dongjiang Region, which is adjacent to Chosŏn and responsible for collecting and transmitting Chosŏn-related intelligence, did not send relevant report, the Ming Court decided to stay on the sidelines. Shortly after the Ming Court ordered Pi Island to provide Chosŏn with military support, Chosŏn surrendered, and Pi Island was subsequently occupied by the allied forces. The ''absence'' of the Ming in the battle was a key factor in determining the outcome of the invasion. Due to mistakes in intelligence collection, the Ming Court failed to assist Chosŏn in time and lost the opportunity to attack the rear of the Qing. The loss of Chosŏn and Pi Island made the Ming fall into a more passive situation on the Liaodong battlefield.