心有徵知──析論《荀子》中禮義道德之實踐可能

Exploring the Possibility of Moral Practice in Xunzi

「禮」作為傳統儒家思想核心之一：相比《論語》、《孟子》，主要以「仁」等的倫理情感解釋「禮」，視「禮」為內在道德情感的外化表現|《荀子》則提倡「禮生於聖人之偽」，強調「禮」為外在理性產物，而「心」能自主思慮抉擇，呈現有別於《論》、《孟》的一套禮學思想。《荀子》透過提出「人之性惡」，將道德價值抽離於道德本體之外，認為「禮」的起源藉由思辨建構。然而，基於其性惡論的主張下，道德的確立缺少了本體根基，未能充分證明「禮」的起因，這是《荀子》思想備受批評的地方，亦為其道德實踐研究今天所需正面處理的論題核心。有見及此，本文將嘗試解構《荀子》有關「聖人生禮義」的心體活動過程，並藉以歸論《荀子》中，禮義道德如何能得到實踐的可能。

'Li'' is regarded as an important concept in Confucianism. While the Analects and Mencius both regard li as a kind of external expression of inner morality, Xunzi proposes that ''li is created by the sage'', and is the result of the learning effort of human beings in response to the external context rather than a kind of inner virtue since Xunzi believes that human nature is evil. As a result, the pursuit of morality requires a conscious transformation of innate human nature by learning from ritual and self-reflecting the external impact, instead of a manifestation of inherent moral characteristics. Hence, Xunzi is always criticized that his theory of li is unable to be established since people are born lacking moral values. In this paper, I try to explain how moral conscience is possible by re-examining the self-cultivation process of sages and how morality could be possible within the framework of Xunzi.