論德性之知與見聞之知之實踐意義：常知、真知與自然的辯證

On the Practical Meanings of Knowledge of Virtue and Knowledge of Common Sense: Common Moral Cognition, Authentic Moral Cognition and Natural Dialectic

宋明儒學的主要課題是如何由工夫以成聖，此自是儒者道德實踐基礎的第一義。而儒者又同時肩負治國平天下的責任，是以也需要有治理國家的外王的知識技能。因此，儒者同時強調「智以輔仁」。知識與道德工夫的關係也成為儒者的重要課題。張橫渠在《正蒙》首先提出「德性之知」與「見聞之知」的超越區分，主張「德性之知不萌於見聞」，成聖的工夫只能由「德性之知」入手。這是宋明儒學的共識。程伊川不但認同此說，更進一步提出「真知」與「常知」之區分，以說明如何由「知而不行」的「常知」進到實踐上必能依「德性之知」而行的「真知」。朱子認為心之「虛靈明覺」只表現為同一種「知」，並不認同橫渠對「德性之知」與「見聞之知」的兩種「知」的區分，而主張「德性之知」也須要通過「見聞之知」方能發展，兩者只有心之「知」之運用的深淺，即，淺者只限於見聞之知|深者則能由「然」推「所以然」之理，對於超越的性理能夠「見得到」，即成功「德性之知」。而在「德性之知」之內再以深淺區分「真知」與「常知」。「常知」只是由聽聞而來，只是「見得到」，但「信不及」，故有知而不行的弊病。但「常知」可以通過不斷的格物窮理而對於「德性之知」達到「見得到，信得及」的「真知」境界，此則必會順理而行，成就道德行動。對於知識與道德實踐的關係，自是當代新儒學內部所關注的一個課題。由於西方文化與哲學的東漸，各種社會與科學知識日新月異，不但成為治理天下國家所必須的龐雜的知識技能，且對於道德實踐具有更大的影響力。楊祖漢先生近年即深入探討此中的工夫問題，主張引入康德強調要以「哲學思辯」回應在道德實踐中產生的「自然的辯證」的阻礙，對於伊川朱子在「常知」與「真知」的轉化提升上，提出新的說明，和如何以「哲學思辯」擴充儒家的工夫實踐。但此一「思辯工夫」的介入，卻有違儒家以人人皆能本良知良能即能實踐道德，不必知識與思辯之介入，更不能以此為必要的工夫實踐歷程，否則會排除一般人的道德實踐的真實性，此實有傷「人之為人」之義。因此，本文詳盡覆檢伊川與朱子之說，包括「德性之知」與「見聞之知」、「常知」與「真知」在「居敬涵養」、「格物致知」，以至「心」、「性」、「理」等重要概念在成德工夫上的意義，確定伊川與朱子在義理形態雖不盡相同，但對於成就「德性之知」而發為「真知」之實踐，仍然只是實踐工夫之發用，而與「思辯」無關。本文最後簡論伊川與朱子之工夫論在討論當代西方倫理學中的「內在論」與「外在論」之區分，與回答「為何要道德？」的重要意義。

The main issue of Song Ming Confucianism is how to employ moral self-cultivation to become a sage. This is certainly the foundation of Confucian moral practice. However, Confucians also take as their primordial duty the ruling of the state, hence, statecraft and related knowledge is also a necessity for Confucians. Confucianism emphasizes the auxiliary help of chi (knowledge) in the practice of ren (humanity). The relation of knowledge and moral cultivation becomes an important issue for Confucianism. Chang Hengqu (Chang Tsai) in his famous book of Cheng Meng proposes the transcendental distinction of ''knowledge of virtue'' and ''knowledge of common sense'', and declares that ''knowledge of virtue does not grows from knowledge of common sense''. It is through the self-cultivation by the knowledge of virtue could one become a sage. This becomes the consensus of Song Ming Confucianism. Cheng Yi Chuan (Cheng Yi) acknowledge this and goes on to a further distinction of authentic moral cognition and common moral cognition in order to explain how to improve the latter, which may not be carried through in moral practice, to the level of the former, which will definitely put our moral duty into moral practice. Zhu Xi regards the two kinds of knowledge both comes from the same kind of cognitive function of our heart-mind and disagrees with Chang Tsai's distinction. He regards the two as different level of cognition and insists that it is through the knowledge of common sense that we could achieve the knowledge of virtue. When we stay in a shallow kind of cognitive level, we have only knowledge of the common sense| when we goes deeper with reflection from the actual up to the reason that lies beyond, then we could realize the transcendental knowledge of virtue. Zhu Xi also thinks that the difference between authentic moral cognition and common sense moral cognition is also only a difference in degree. The latter usually comes from hear-saying without personal real experience and so achieves a kind of knowing but not truly embraced as what matters and hence may not put our moral knowledge into practice. But, we could and have to expand our common sense moral cognition through continuous moral self-cultivation by reaching the matters directly and exhausting the reason beyond (ge-wu qiong-li), then we could ultimately arrive at the authentic cognition of virtue. We are thus not only know the moral virtue but really embrace it and would put it into practice. This is also an issue with contemporary Neo-Confucianism. In the widespread of western culture and philosophy in the East as well as in China, the forever evolving and growing body of knowledge of social and natural sciences becomes not only the knowledge and technics of running a state, but also influential in moral self-cultivation. Yang Cho-hon recently takes up this issue of moral self-cultivation and proposes the introduction of the method of philosophical reflections, which Kant introduces for the treatment of the obstruction of natural dialectic in our moral practice, as a method for the solution of the transformation of the common sense moral cognition into authentic moral cognition. However, this intrusion of philosophical reflection so as to expand our moral practice is somehow in opposition to the Confucian basic conception that everybody could have true moral actions with our natural and direct response to the call of our moral conscience (liang-chi), with no need from the help of reflections. It would be detrimental to the recognition that everybody be valued as person as such if philosophical reflection is regarded as a necessity for true moral practice. In this paper, I investigate in great depth about the relations between knowledge of virtue and knowledge of common sense, the relation of common sense moral cognition and authentic moral cognition in the method of moral selfcultivation of ''respectfulness and containment'', ''reaching the matters and investigating its ultimate reasons'' as well as the basic concepts of xin (heartmind ), xing (human nature) and li (reason) in the sayings of Yi Chuan and Zhu Xi, and comes to the conclusion that it is by moral self-cultivation in practice, not philosophical reflection, that figures in the achievement of moral cognition. Lastly, the significance of Yi Chuan and Zhu Xi's moral self-cultivation on the controversial issues of internalism and externalism, of the problem of ''why be moral?'' are succinctly outlined, showing the importance of moral self-cultivation in moral development and ethical analysis.