英文摘要 |
Contemporary research on theories of reasons helps us understand the complexity of the relationship among reason, desire, and motivation. Through investigating various philosophers' moral theories, we are able to distinguish their similarities and dissimilarities of how this complicated relationship came about. At the same time, comparative studies offer a new perspective to investigate Neo-Confucian philosophies and thus to help us conceive theoretical orientation of them. This paper attempts to use the modern terminology such as moral judgment, reason-for-action, and motivation to re-interpret Wang Yang-Ming's theory of Liangzhi. Based on the re-interpretation, (1) I seek to argue for the constitution of the model of Wang Yang Ming's Liangzhi (良知) Internalism.'' The Liangzhi internalism means that Liangzhi by itself legislates the moral law for the action| Liangzhi's moral judgment is a reason-for-action which necessarily provides motivating force for moral practice. (2) Liangzhi internalism is able to respond the ambiguous interpretation that has existed in scholars' debates on his moral theory. Using the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy to interpret Neo-Confucianism has been the mainstream for Sinophone academic writers. Based on this interpretative approach, I will bring in respectively core concepts of internalism and externalism to investigate Wang Yang Ming's philosophy. I design an ''AHIE Quadrant,'' including internalism-autonomy, internalism-heteronomy, externalism-autonomy, and externalism-heteronomy. This AHIE quadrant is helpful for us to clarify the theoretical orientation of Wang Yang-Ming's Liangzhi Theory, and so is Neo-Confucianism. |