從東亞視域論丁茶山對孟子性善論的解釋及其思想史定位

Jeong Yak-yong's Interpretation of Mencius's Theory of Human Nature and Its Place in the History of East Asian Confucianism

本文分析朝鮮儒者若鏞丁茶山（1762—1836）對孟子性善論的詮釋，並從以下兩個問題出發探討茶山孟子學的內涵：（1）茶山丁若鏞如何在十八世紀的朝鮮重新解釋孟子的性善論？（2）茶山的孟子學在東亞儒學史上應如何被定位？本文第二節探討茶山對孟子性善論的解釋，指出茶山詮釋孟子之哲學立場在「心性論」，茶山提出「性嗜好說」最具創見，以「心」為首出，並反對形上學|本文第三節將茶山孟子學置於東亞視域中，將茶山孟子學與宋代中國的朱子、十八世紀日本大阪懷德堂朱子學者中井履軒與清代中國戴震之孟子學互作比較，以突顯丁茶山在東亞孟子學史上「後朱子學」的涵義，第四節提出結論，指出茶山解釋孟子性善論時所關心的問題在於「善如何可能？」，就人之善性的「根源義」立論，論證之核心問題在「價值」（value）而不在「存有」（being）。

This paper examines Jeong Yak-yong's (Dasan, 1762-1836) interpretation of Mencius's views on the fundamental goodness of human nature. It also attempts to situate Dasan's view of Mencius in the context of East Asian Confucianism. I argue that the philosophical stance of Jeong Yak-yong lies in the theory of mind-heart. His interpretation of Mencius gives priority to mind-heart over all other things. It is on the basis of the philosophy of mind-heart that Jeong Yak-yong launches his vehement attack against the metaphysics of Song Neo-Confucians in general, and of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) in particular. I also compare the outlook of Dasan with that of Zhu Xi, Nakai Riken (1732-1817) and Dai Zhen (1724-1777), and indicate that Dasan's position may be best characterized as ''post-Zhu Xi-ism.'' I conclude by saying that the central issue that Dasan addressed himself to is ''How is goodness possible?'' rather than ''What are the benefits resulting from goodness?'' Dasan is concerned with the problem of ''value'' rather than the problem of ''being.''