A Revisit to Timing/Location Games with Directional Constraints

再探方向性限制下的時點（區位）賽局

The research purpose of this paper is to show that an equilibrium exists in the timing/location game with directional constraints, as based on Cancian et al. (1995), if firms are unable to precommit to their timing of entry at the beginning of the game. In equilibrium, all firms sequentially enter the market, while the timing differentiation between any two consecutive entry patterns and the payoffs of all firms are equalized.
本文證明，若廠商無法在賽局期初，事先承諾其進入市場的時點，則Cancian et al.（1995）方向性限制下的時點（區位）賽局均衡存在。廠商均衡時依序進入市場，且任兩家依序進入市場的廠商之時點差異均等，而所有廠商均衡利潤相等。