孟子式的道德行動觀與道德情感──倪德衛與牟宗三

The Mencian Idea of Moral Action and Moral Feeling-David S. Nivison and Mou Zongsan

本文比較倪德衛（David S. Nivison）的孟子詮釋，以及牟宗三對於正統儒家的理解，並尤其指出：倪德衛所詮釋的孟子有關道德行動的觀點，和牟宗三所理解的正統儒家的孟子式道德行動觀，驚人地一致，二者都認為道德行動由道德情感引生，而不是實踐道德法則之意向的實現。透過檢視畢遊賽（Sébastien Billioud）對於牟宗三的「覺情」觀念的誤解，本文進一步澄清孟子式的道德行動觀。

David S. Nivison's interpretation of Mencius and Mou Zongsan's understanding of the orthodox Confucianism are compared in this paper. It is pointed out that Nivison attributes to Mencius an idea of moral action that is surprisingly similar to the Mencian idea of moral action that Mou Zongsan ascribes to the orthodox Confucianism. Both of them maintain that a moral action is caused by moral feelings instead of being the realization of the intention to follow a moral law. The Mencian idea of moral action is then further clarified through critically examining Sébastien Billioud's understanding of Mou Zongsan's idea of the arousing feeling (jueqing).