英文摘要 |
This paper aims to find practical policy implications by analyzing the compatibility and institutional design problems in linking multiple carbon markets as a bottom-up approach between national, sub-national, and non-state actors. This analysis is crucial in propelling the implementation of a transnational climate change scheme, primarily led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a top-down model. The compatibility analysis includes issues relevant to possible linkage between different types of instruments (e.g. cap-and-trade, carbon tax, or intensity-based schemes; the level of stringency of a regulatory scheme in a jurisdiction; and the oversight mechanism for a linkage). The discussion of the institutional design problems reviews the choice of structure, degree of integration, the basic legal instrument, and termination of a linkage. The primary policy implications derived from the analysis are summarized as follows. First, some crucial design elements of carbon markets should be adjusted before the markets are linked in order to effectively achieve the environmental regulatory goal and maintain an economically and politically stable market. Some market elements that previously have been recognized as rather technical should be re-evaluated to show the importance of harmonization before a linkage. Second, as for the legal instrument and structure for the linkage, adding more flexibility would help to consummate the linkage and enable more jurisdictions, including sub-national actors, to join without necessarily sacrificing stability. |