阿利森對康德「自由理論」的詮釋

On Allison's Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Freedom

本文要處理阿利森對康德自由理論的詮釋，這也許是他被攻擊最多的詮釋。他把康德的自由理論區分為1781之間的自由理論〔以《第一批判》的內容為主，他稱為半批判的道德理論（Allison, 1990: 67）〕與成熟的自由理論〔以《第二批判》為代表〕。阿利森在《康德的自由理論》一書第一部分中展開他對於《第一批判》的自由理論，他的核心命題是：這個時期康德想要論證一種理性的行為能力，它建立在一種實踐的自由之上；在《康德的自由理論》的第三部分中，阿利森進一步主張，為了第一個自由理論的證成問題，康德發展了第二個較成熟的自由理論，康德在這裡提出先驗自由的概念作為實踐自由得以證成的關鍵。而阿利森認為在1785年的《道德形上學基礎》中對先驗自由的證成是失敗的，康德直到《第二批判》才成功地解決先驗自由的問題，他稱康德這組論證為「相互包含命題」和「理性事實學說」。本文主要目的要嘗試重構阿利森的論證，並且在一些關鍵點提出自己的評論。

The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison's interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant's theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant's Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant's theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third part of Kant's Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant's arguments ”Reciprocity Thesis” and ”Doctrine of fact of pure reason”. The main objective of this paper attempts to reconstruct Allison's arguments, and on some crucial points, add some comments.