英文摘要 |
This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine's polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine's succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translation suggested by Hintikka's Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka's semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka's behavioural data tells against Hookway's proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed to enjoy. |