自由意志與事件起因

Free Will and Event Causation

由恰當描述、說明行動與事件起因之間的關係，可消除自由意志行使的論述困境。本文檢討三項試圖解決此論述困境的途徑：其一，循事件起因的節制，詮釋自由；其二，由機率起因說明選擇自由的可能；其三，由當事人起因說明。此三者，皆有令人難以接受之處。本文追索出此三者共通之假設，由否定該假設，在基本觀念上，做一關鍵微調，而循生活行動、處境調節的歷程，重新瞭解行動選擇和事件起因之間的關連。此微調核心在於：深層來看，事件起因、行動選擇，本是生活行動、處境調節歷程中，同一事理相循相隨的不同面向。本文由交叉質問辯駁，循序闡明此關鍵微調的哲學立論基礎。

The dilemma we are in when we reflect on the free power of choice in our person and our place in the causal world can be dissolved if the relationship between action and event causation is appropriately described and explained. The present study examines three approaches to the dilemma: The first is based on how to interpret freedom given event causation, the second based on having leeway given probabilistic causation, and the third based on a postulation of agent-causation. None of them is found satisfactory. By finding out and negating their common assumption, the present study proposes a way of fine-tuning our conceptualization of what it is to act, and to choose, in a world enmeshed with causality. The core idea of the proposal is that, at bottom, event causation and the ways we act and choose are inseparable from each other in our embodied interactions with the environment. The philosophical basis of the proposal is made explicit and defended.