論富蘭克福特式的例子與其他可能性的原則

On Frankfurt-style Examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

在討論自由意志問題中，我們要問：為什麼我們應該關心自己是否有自由意志以及決定論是否是真的？我們之所以關心自己是否有自由意志是因為我們關心道德責任。一個行為者如果沒有自由意志，那麼就不能要求他負道德責任。這個原則就是其他選擇可能性原則”（the principle of alternative possibilities 簡稱PAP）。PAP是這樣的：一個人為他所做的行為道德責任，那麼他能做其他不同的事。Harry G. Frankfurt在”Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” （Journal of Philosophy 66, 1969, pp.829-39）一文中，提出反例，證明PAP是假的。針對Frankfurt所提出的反例，有不同的回應。最普遍的反應是：認為在反例中確實有其他選擇的可能性—微弱的自由（flicker of freedom）。有各種不同理由支持這個觀點。Fischer反對這微弱的自由可以做為道德的基礎。另外有的哲學家認為反例中預設因果決定論，行動者不要為他的行為負道德責任。Van Inwagen認為PAP不成立，但他提出另外三個原則來重新建立做其他不同事的能力與責任之間的關聯。本論文討論Frankfurt的反例是否反駁了PAP。反例是否是真正的反例？（1）反例中是否確實有其他選擇的可能性？（2）反例中的行動者是否要負責？（3）Van Inwagen的三原則是否有效地把做其他不同事的能力與責任關聯在一起？以釐清能有其他選擇的可能性與道德責任之間的關聯，以便對自由意志問題的能有比較有效的探討。

There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called ”the principle of alternate possibilities” (hereinafter: PAP) which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (”Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66, 1969, pp. 829-39) The ”Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt-style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt-style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen's three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.