英文摘要 |
This study aims to compare the cooperative behavior of Taiwan and American students in the social dilemma situation. The effects of sanction system and the player's degree of collectivism on cooperation are the foci of the study. It was found that for Taiwan subjects, either 'high probability of inspection' or 'high degree of punishment' can reduce incooperaitve behavior significantly, yet for American subjects, only 'inspection probability known or not' factor has a significant main effect on cooperation. In respects to Collectivism/Individualism Scale, it was found that subjects from two cultures did not differ on total collective scores, but Taiwan subjects scored higher on collectivism toward spouses, parents, and relatives, and American subjects scored higher on colletivism toward colleagues/classmates and friends than their counterparts. This was proposed to be the main reason for the finding that Taiwan subjects were less cooperaive than American subjects in the present social dilemma situation. In addition, it was found that subjects with the motives to maximize 'joint gain' cooperated the most, while 'individual gain' and 'relative gain' subjects cooperated less and did not differ from each other. General discussion from social identity perspective concluded this paper. |