論經濟分析在法學方法之運用

On the Use of Economic Analysis in Legal Methodology

法律經濟分析與法釋義學研究向來鮮少對話，本文嘗試將法律經濟分析整合運用至傳統法學方法：首先，經濟分析除了在部分條文之文義、歷史解釋不可或缺，更可藉由目的解釋或結果取向解釋的論證架構，成為法律解釋與法律續造的方法。因此，經濟分析不是獨立的法律解釋方法，而可融入於既有的法釋義學架構。其次，經濟分析追求的效率分為一階和二階：「一階效率」乃是直接作為實質規範目的之效率，尤其是資源配置效率與生產效率。「二階效率」則是權衡解決目的（原則、價值、利益）衝突之效率考量─亦即最適化或最大化實現一組可能相衝突之目的。體系上，民事財產法之內在原則，多可由效率原則推導而出，是故效率可以作為民事財產法內部體系的統一性基礎，且由於法律原則具有最適化要求的規範結構，故任何法律原則的適用都內建了二階效率。最後，經濟分析有助於解決不同解釋方法之衝突與優先性等後設方法論問題，效率標準可以作為證成、選擇法律解釋以及是否採取法律續造的理由。 Scholars using economic analysis of law and the doctrinal study of law rarely have a meaningful dialogue. This article attempts to incorporate economic analysis into the doctrinal study of law, the traditional legal methodology, in the following ways. First, economic analysis is not only essential in the textual and historical interpretations in certain statutes but also a type of teleological argument in purposive interpretations of statutes. Hence, economic analysis of law can be integrated into the traditional canons of interpretation, rather than serving as a stand-alone interpretive approach. Second, efficiency, the normative goal of economic analysis of law, can be categorized into first order and second order. First-order efficiency is a substantive goal, such as allocative efficiency and production efficiency. Second-order efficiency is a tool for weighing competing values, goals, interests or principles; put differently, second-order efficiency optimizes or maximizes a set of potentially incompatible purposes. First-order efficiency can explain and justify most immanent principles of private law and thus constitute the unity foundation of the internal system of private law. Since legal principles have the structure of optimization requirements, second-order efficiency is embedded in the application of every principle. Finally, economic analysis can play the role of meta-methodology, justifying a choice of one among mulitple conflicting interpretations from different interpretive approaches. Efficiency can be employed as a normative reason to justify a choice of legal interpretation and to create judge-made law.