英文摘要 |
In the U. S. A, the FTAIA has long been viewed predominantly as a jurisdictional limitation to the Sherman Act rather than a limit on its substantive applicability. In most cases, the American courts referred to the FTAIA as a jurisdictional nexus and as the requirements to establish subject matter jurisdiction. If the conduct in question did not harm domestic commerce and had no anticompetitive effects on American market, there was then no subject matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA. The confusion between the jurisdictional interpretation and the substantive interpretation of the FTAIA has a harmful influence on Chinese lawyers. They tend to interpret Article II of the Anti-Monopoly Law as a jurisdictional limitation on Chinese courts. In Huawei v. IDC, Guangdong Higher People's Court tried to give us a new understanding of Article II of the Anti-Monopoly Law. A distinction should be made between the public enforcement and the private enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. For the private enforcement, Article II of the Anti-Monopoly Law should not be understood as a jurisdictional clause. Since China's Anti-Monopoly Law is mainly an economic public law, Article II is mainly used for the administrative agencies to initiative antitrust investigations against the conducts outside the territory of China. The antitrust civil litigation should be included within the framework of international private law. |