異質寡占下之市場集中度與單位授權金

Market Concentration and Licensing Royalty in an Asymmetric Oligopoly

本文以一個非對稱的寡占模型來探討市場集中度與單位授權金的關係，在模型中，技術母廠遵循RAND原則以單位授權金及固定權利金的組合授權給在市場競爭的廠商。以成本變異作為市場集中度的代理變數下，本文研究表明當市場需求為線性時，單位授權金與市場集中度是獨立的；但是，當市場需求為凹向原點時，市場集中度與單位授權金呈現正向關係，即當市場集中度愈高時，單位授權金也會提升，但是此一正向關係在市場需求為凸向原點時會轉變成負向關係。因此，消費市場的需求情形對於單位授權金與市場集中度兩者之間的關係具有關鍵性影響。

This paper studies the interaction of market concentration and licensing royalty for an innovator following RAND terms under an asymmetric oligopoly in which the technology transfer takes place from the innovator to firms having asymmetric cost. Taking cost variance as a proxy to evaluate market concentration, this paper shows that the nexus of market concentration and licensing royalty is highly sensitive to the curvature of market demand. When market demand is concave (convex) to the origin, the nexus of market concentration and royalty rate is positive (negative), whereas in the case of linear demand the royalty is independent of market concentration. As a result, market concentration and market demand crucially affect the licensing royalty.