從「我們的憲法」、「我們」到「我們的釋憲者」：形塑非國民之憲法上權利主體

From “Our Constitution”, “Our People”, to “Our Justices”:Constructing ANon-Citizen “People”

我國傳統憲法理論於探討憲法權利主體時，通常始於一個似乎不證自明之前提：國民身為國家成員，自為憲法上完整之權利主體，並當然受到所有憲法上權利之保障，而僅在何等基本權依性質應將保障向外延伸至非國民上，存有不同意見。本文首先試圖從憲法文本及憲法基本原理，反面論證此一國民非國民之二元他我之別與憲法權利保障間之關聯並非必然，且憲法對於權利主體其實留有一定之形塑空間，而可由釋憲者（而非政治部門）加以解釋。本文次於實際檢視我國相關實定法如國籍法、移民法、戶籍法等後，更發現傳統憲法理論中的二元他我之別，在現行法的實踐上卻與預想不同，而呈現為光譜般的多重區別，且司法審查也對此一區別光譜回敬以寬嚴不同之審查密度。隨後本文先透過分析過去司法院大法官對涉及他我之別之法律違憲審查，點出釋憲者所作成之他我之別判斷為何，再透過大法官選任制度，思考釋憲者自身是不是也成為此一區別之客體、如此又對其憲法職務之行使有何影響。最後本文以如何在既有憲法框架下，促生一個更多元、更在地之憲法權利主體作結。 The prevailing theories of qualified subject of constitutional rights usually assume that citizen, as the members of the state, shall be the standard subject of constitutional rights and be guaranteed all the rights in the Constitution. These theories disagree only on of which rights the guarantee is extended to non-citizens. This Article first critically reviews the text of the Constitution and other relevant constitutional and political scientific theories to refute the assumption that the guarantee of constitutional rights must be tied to the citizen/non-citizen distinction. Specifically, this Article traces back the development of the two early models of citizenship, the republic model and the liberal model, and reasons that, in terms of constructing the deserving subject of constitutional rights, both models were after the ideal of inclusion, as opposed to exclusion. Furthermore, this Article argues that the Constitution actually leaves room for the judiciary’s (as opposed to the political departments’) flexible construction of the subject of constitutional rights. To review the current legal system of citizenship and immigration law, this Article then examines related congressional acts and regulations, such as the Nationality Act, the Immigration Act and the Act of Household Registration, and discovers that the execution of this binary citizen/non-citizen distinction turned out to be an unexpected multi-level distinction over a broad spectrum, which also leads to differentiated standards of judicial review. In this specturm of multi-level distinction, individuals are excluded, in whole or in part, from the protection of constitutional rights merely for a violation or noncompliance of immigration laws and regulations. Subsequently, this Article first analyzes the relevant J.Y. Interpretations to describe the us-them distinction adopted by the Justices and then by looking into the process of Justices’ nomination and appointment, discusses whether the Justices themselves are also subject to this us-them distinction and how this might affect their performance of the constitutional duty. Finally, this Article concludes with how to construct a more diverse yet localized membership under the Constitution.