論死亡之剝奪說

On Deprivation Account of Death

伊比鳩魯在〈給美諾西厄斯的信〉中提到死亡本身其實並沒有什麼，所以根本無需懼怕，我認為在他的論證中潛藏三個非常重要的預設：（1）快樂主義；（2）物理主義以及（3）存在要求。表面上看起來，伊比鳩魯的論證似乎是成立的，由於人死亡之後就沒有任何感覺，也就不會有任何快樂或痛苦的感受，所以，對死亡者本身而言，他顯然無法評斷死亡這個事件對自己而言到底是好或不好。然而，沒有實際感覺到某個事件所帶來的痛苦經驗，對某人而言就沒有好或不好的評價嗎？事實不然。我在本篇論文中將試圖透過剝奪說證明即使某人無法實際感受到某個事件對他而言是快樂或痛苦，該事件對其本身而言是好或不好仍然是可以評價的，並且透過價值比較理論證成對某人而言，即使他沒有實際感受到該事件帶來的痛苦，我們仍然會同意該事件對他而言確實造成傷害的論題。因此，伊比鳩魯認為死亡並沒有什麼的論證並不成立。 In ＂Letter to Menoeceus＂, Epicurus contended that death is nothing to us since it is the deprivation of all sensations. I find that his argument implies at least three assumptions, which are hedonism, physicalism and existence requirement. At first glance, Epicurus' argument seemed to be acceptable due to one is deprived all his sensations and unable to estimate whether death is good or bad for him when death comes. So, it is concluded that death is nothing to us. However, the question follows: is something really not bad for a person if one has no capacity to acquire the unpleasant experiences? I must say that the answer is 'No'. In this essay, I will argue that something is bad for the people even they don't have any unpleasant experience and most of us will agree that he is indeed harmed by the lack of pleasant experiences. Thus, Epicurus' argument is implausible because the strong version of existence requirement is not justified.