生產者之空間訂價及產品退還策略與零售業者間競爭行為之經濟分析

Manufacturer's Spatial Pricing, Returns Policies and Retail Competition

本文沿用Weber區位模型，探討在一個獨占之上游生產者，將其產品出售給二個雙占下游零售業者時，生產者在不同的產品退還策略，與零售業者間存在競爭行為下，如果採取不同之空間訂價策略，對於生產者與零售商之訂價與利潤之影響。由本文之分析結果得到：1.如果零售業者間不存在競爭行為時，則無論生產者是採取不可退還策略或完全可退還策略，其均衡結果將完全相同；2.不論零售業者間是否存在競爭行為，以及生產者是否採取退還策略，三種訂價方式下各項經濟效果之大小順序比較結果完全相同；亦即生產者之利潤是以差別訂價為最高，零售業者之利潤則以單一出廠價格訂價者為最高；3.如果零售業者間存在競爭行為，則不論在何種訂價方式下，當生產者採取完全可退還策略峙，可以讓零售業者進貨產品滯銷之風險降低，並提升或強化零售業者在價格方面之競爭，進而使得生產者之總銷售量與利潤為之上升；此項結果亦可作為實務上生產者願意採取退還策略之理論依據。 The purpose of this paper is to explicitly incorporate manufacturer's returns policy incorporate into Weber's triangular location model and reexamine the effect on price and profit of manufacturer and retailers under alternative spatial pricing policies. To address this issue, the benchmark setting is there is a single upstream manufacturer provides a limited shelf life product, and sells it to two downstream competitive retailers. The manufacturer behaves like a Stackelberg leader, and the retailers must have stocks in hand before selling to consumers. Base on our results, we have the following conclusions. 1.Whether there is a returns policy or not, the equilibrium results make no difference. 2.The ranking of choice make variables under alternative pricing policies will not be influenced by retailer competition or returns policy. 3.When manufacturer accepts returns from the retailers, it intensifies the competition between retailers and benefits the manufacturer. The insight about the role of return policy is that it can be an another instrument to raise the manufacturer's profit.