高階經理人現金薪酬對重組支出與重組支出迴轉之不對稱敏感度：論薪酬委員會有效性之影響

Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Restructuring Charges and Restructuring Charge Reversals: The Impacts of Compensation Committee Effectiveness

This study examines whether CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to restructuring charges than to the reversals of restructuring charges, i.e., an asymmetric treatment for restructuring charges and the related reversals. In addition, given that executive compensation design itself may be an agency problem, we also examine whether this asymmetric treatment varies with compensation committee effectiveness. Using a US sample of firm-year observations, this study finds that there is an asymmetric compensation sensitivity to restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals. Furthermore, we find that highly effective compensation committees reduce the compensation weight more on restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals compared to compensation committees characterized by low effectiveness. The overall results imply that firms with highly effective compensation committees encourage prospective restructuring activities by shielding executive compensation from the effect of restructuring charges, and filter restructuring charge reversals from CEO compensation to avoid opportunistic behavior of rent extraction. However, restructuring charge reversals are rewarded by committees characterized by low effectiveness through the placement of a higher compensation weight, which is consistent with the view of managerial rent extraction. 本研究旨在檢視高階經理人現金薪酬對重組支出項目（具盈餘降低效果）與重組支出迴轉項目（具盈餘增加效果）是否具不對稱之敏感度。此外，由於高階經理人薪酬設計本身可能隱含代理問題，故進一步檢視，是否此不對稱薪酬處理會隨著薪酬委員會有效性而有所不同。本研究以美國公司為樣本，實證發現：高階經理人現金薪酬對重組支出與重組支出迴轉具不對稱之敏感度。此外發現，高度有效性薪酬委員會相對低度有效性委員會而言，其對重組支出與重組支出迴轉此二項目有較大的薪酬權數調降。整體結果隱含：公司薪酬委員會有效性較高時，較能大幅調降重組支出的薪酬權數以鼓勵具前景的重組活動，但對重組支出迴轉項目則予以濾除其對薪酬的效果，以避免管理者投機行為；薪酬委員會有效性較低的公司則仍給予重組支出迴轉項目較高的薪酬權數，偏向於利益掠奪觀點。