中文摘要 |
Since the pioneer work by Gordon (1954), it has been well-recognized that too many resources will be devoted to the utilization of common property fisheries. With no regulations in place, common property fisheries will be exploited to such an extent that the total revenue of fishing effort will equate its total cost. The economic rent of the fishery will dissipate and fishery resources will be over-exploited or even mined ── a consequence which is termed 'the tragedy of the commons. 'Therefore, government intervention in the exploitation of fishery resources has generally been considered as a necessary, although not necessarily a sufficient, condition for efficient utilization of fisheries (Agnello and Anderson 1981). Maximum economic yield (MEY) has been suggested as the proper economic objective for utilizing fishery resources. When a fishery is utilized at its MEY, the marginal revenue of fishing effort equates its marginal cost so that the return to the fishery resource is maximized (see Anderson 1977 for detailed discussions). |