明代的兀良哈三衛撫賞及其經費之籌措

Rewards and the Financing of Rewards for the Three Wuliangha Guards During the Ming Dynasty

本文探討明代一個與防禦蒙古有關的外交策略，及其牽涉到的償付盟友「勞務津貼」的制度。自十五世紀初開始，明朝藉由賜予頭銜與犒賞物資，籠絡蒙古草原東部的兀良哈三衛部落，以便提早獲得蒙古兵入侵的訊息，從而預先展開軍事佈防。起初之犒賞，僅只喜峰口這一關口。每年，部落酋長率團前往北京朝貢之時，都由喜峰口入境，明朝將領便在此處以酒席款待或賞賜鹽、米、衣袍、綢緞等。十五世紀中葉，兀良哈三衛部落因受到蒙古威脅，逐步向南移動，並在燕山山脈各個關口討取零星的犒賞。守邊將領為了息事寧人，只好答應其「非分」的要求。但為應付這筆「無中生有」的開支，商稅、地租、罰款、香油錢等都被挪用，甚至還挖煤炭出售，或貸給商舖銀兩以抽取利息，但最常見的是命士兵越過邊界砍伐建材與柴薪，運入境內變賣。由於討賞者越來越多，開支隨之日漸增加，即使想盡各種辦法東挪西湊，收入還是遠遠跟不上開銷。在此情況下，唯一的辦法是向中央求援，而戶部與兵部即成為邊區財政匱乏時的「提款機」。1552年，中央首次應允撥給銀4,000兩。經過多次請求，補助金額不斷添加。至1591年，犒賞費用增至銀50,099兩，中央為解決士兵被壓榨的問題，決定全數補助，但後續還是有所增加，至1623年，補助款又追加至55,993兩。然而，命令士兵越界採薪賣錢補貼，一直至明末還是存在。另一方面，掌管此事的軍官貪瀆不法，也是財政漏洞的一個來源。對於邊疆部族的籠絡與犒賞，成為某些軍官上下其手的好機會。而且，所採購的賞賜物品與酒菜質量亦良莠不齊，造成前來領賞的兀良哈部民心生怨懟。本文所處理的個案，僅是明代軍費擴張的一個縮影，其中充斥著人謀不臧的成分。 This paper discusses one of the Ming Dynasty’s diplomatic strategies for defense against the Mongols, and the dynasty’s use of a system that paid ‘labor allowances’ to its allies. Since the beginning of the early 15th century, the Ming Dynasty had given titles and rewards in order to win over tribes of the Wuliangha Guards on the eastern Mongolian steppes. In return, they would give early warnings on invasions by Mongolian troops, so that military defense and deployment could be carried out in advance. In the beginning, rewards were given at the Hsifengkou Pass only. Every year, as tribal chiefs and their entourages entered through the Hsifengkou Pass to go to Beijing to pay tribute, Ming generals would set up banquets at the pass to entertain them or give them gifts of salt, rice, clothing, silk, etc. In the mid-15th century, the tribes of the three Wuliangha Guards gradually moved southwards because of threats from Mongolia. They collected rewards sporadically at passes in the Yan Mountains Range. The Ming frontier generals could only give in to their “supplementary” demands in order to keep the peace. Revenues from business tax, land rent, fines, and incense donations were misappropriated to fund these “unplanned” expenditures. The Ming generals even used revenue from coal mining and interest on loans to merchants, but the most common practice was to order soldiers to cross the borders to cut down trees for building materials or firewood, which they transported back inside the border to sell. As the demand for rewards grew, the expenses increased. In spite of exhaustive efforts to raise funds by various means, the income could not keep up with these expenses. Under the circumstances, the only option was to ask for help from the central government. The Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of War became the “cash machine” for the fiscal deficit of the border administration. In 1552, the central government allocated for the first time a subsidy of 4,000 taels of silver. As the requests multiplied, the amount of the subsidy increased continuously. By 1591, reward expenses had increased to 50,099 taels of silver. The central government decided to subsidize the full amount in the hope of resolving the exploitation of soldiers. However, the expenses continued to increase. By 1623, the subsidies were increased to 55,993 taels of silver. Nevertheless, the practice of ordering soldiers to cross the border to collect firewood and sell them as their subsidies (which were usually directly deducted from their salaries according to their monthly quota) continued until the end of the Ming Dynasty. Moreover, another cause of the fiscal deficit was the illegal misappropriation of funds by the military officials in charge. The policy of winning over the frontier tribes with rewards had become a good opportunity for collusion among military officials. Furthermore, the quality of the reward items and the banquets was not always good, and feelings of resentment arose among the Wuliangha tribal people who came to collect the rewards. The case-study in this paper is a microcosm of the expansion of Ming military expenditures, brought about by multiple instances of poor planning.

This paper discusses one of the Ming Dynasty’s diplomatic strategies for defense against the Mongols, and the dynasty’s use of a system that paid ‘labor allowances’ to its allies. Since the beginning of the early 15th century, the Ming Dynasty had given titles and rewards in order to win over tribes of the Wuliangha Guards on the eastern Mongolian steppes. In return, they would give early warnings on invasions by Mongolian troops, so that military defense and deployment could be carried out in advance. In the beginning, rewards were given at the Hsifengkou Pass only. Every year, as tribal chiefs and their entourages entered through the Hsifengkou Pass to go to Beijing to pay tribute, Ming generals would set up banquets at the pass to entertain them or give them gifts of salt, rice, clothing, silk, etc. In the mid-15th century, the tribes of the three Wuliangha Guards gradually moved southwards because of threats from Mongolia. They collected rewards sporadically at passes in the Yan Mountains Range. The Ming frontier generals could only give in to their “supplementary” demands in order to keep the peace. Revenues from business tax, land rent, fines, and incense donations were misappropriated to fund these “unplanned” expenditures. The Ming generals even used revenue from coal mining and interest on loans to merchants, but the most common practice was to order soldiers to cross the borders to cut down trees for building materials or firewood, which they transported back inside the border to sell. As the demand for rewards grew, the expenses increased. In spite of exhaustive efforts to raise funds by various means, the income could not keep up with these expenses. Under the circumstances, the only option was to ask for help from the central government. The Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of War became the “cash machine” for the fiscal deficit of the border administration. In 1552, the central government allocated for the first time a subsidy of 4,000 taels of silver. As the requests multiplied, the amount of the subsidy increased continuously. By 1591, reward expenses had increased to 50,099 taels of silver. The central government decided to subsidize the full amount in the hope of resolving the exploitation of soldiers. However, the expenses continued to increase. By 1623, the subsidies were increased to 55,993 taels of silver. Nevertheless, the practice of ordering soldiers to cross the border to collect firewood and sell them as their subsidies (which were usually directly deducted from their salaries according to their monthly quota) continued until the end of the Ming Dynasty. Moreover, another cause of the fiscal deficit was the illegal misappropriation of funds by the military officials in charge. The policy of winning over the frontier tribes with rewards had become a good opportunity for collusion among military officials. Furthermore, the quality of the reward items and the banquets was not always good, and feelings of resentment arose among the Wuliangha tribal people who came to collect the rewards. The case-study in this paper is a microcosm of the expansion of Ming military expenditures, brought about by multiple instances of poor planning.