江南三角洲圩田水利雜考

On the Management of Dike Systems in the Lower Yangzi Delta

本文以長期對於江南三角洲的文獻研究及田野調查為基礎，透過國家與地方的視野，針對「中國社會的特質」做了理論建構的嘗試，算是作者的一種研究回顧。作者認為，在水資源充分而幾乎不存在洪水或乾旱問題的江南地區，不但在歷史上沒有形成「水利共同體」的條件，即使類似「村落共同體」的社會組織也未見。自吳越錢氏政權時期至明代晚期，此地區的圩田開發在不同的區域速度不一；然而，主佃之間或同一圩圍內部的農家之間，缺乏自行組織合作與共同勞動的關係，也缺乏自行解決水利問題的能力，必須依賴國家權力才能形成新的體系，這即是在宣德、弘治以及萬曆年間當地發生三次水利改革的核心共通點。弘治年間面臨的問題是在兩類地域之間實行何種科派徭役的制度，出現了「水平性的矛盾與對立」。其一是在圩田開發結束且圩內耕地達到均質化的地域，按土地面積科派徭役，即「照田派役」是較為合理的區域；另一地域則是圩田仍在持續開發，且圩內土地生產力不均，對土地位於圩圍外緣者較為有利，故採由外緣的業戶擔任徭役，即「田頭制」較為合理的地域。弘治年間，經由國家介入的改革，史上初次出現圩田水利規章，規定了以田頭制為主軸，但容許部分照田派役的例外情形。萬曆年間，依土地狀況來看，實施照田派役應是萬無問題，但又面臨了新的問題，亦即具有優免徭役特權的城居鄉紳地主，與要求取消優免特權、主張賦稅公平的庶民地主與自耕農之間，呈現了垂直對立。最終藉由國家的處置，逐漸達成了以照田派役、業食佃力、限制優免為主要內容的改革。本文最後說明了作者與高度評價明代後期佃農自立化的小山正明教授在論點上之異同，並總結地說：欠缺中間團體的中國，終究只能藉由國家（專制權力）賦予地方向心力，進而形成合作組織。 Based on a longtime study of primary sources and fieldwork in the Lower Yangzi Delta, the author discusses the longstanding problem regarding the characteristics of Chinese society from the perspective of state-society relations. In what is also a review of his own scholarship, the author points out that the Lower Yangzi Delta is a region where water resources were abundant and flooding or droughts rarely became a problem. Under these circumstances, there was no “hydraulic community,” and even a “village community” did not exist. From the ninth to the early seventeenth century, the development of dike systems varied in different sub-regions. It was nonetheless true that there was no self-organizing mechanism for cooperation or collaboration between landlords and tenants, or among peasants whose fields were located within the same area surrounded by dikes. Consequently, state intervention was needed to build a system able to solve hydraulic problems that the local population had no efficient means to handle. This is the core reason behind the three major hydraulic reforms – in the early fifteenth, late fifteenth, and late sixteenth century respectively – which took place in this region. The challenge of the late fifteenth century arose from conflicts between sub-regions that varied in regard to their development. In sub-regions where the dike system had been fully developed and the lowlands surrounded by the dikes had been equally cultivated, levying corvée service according to the area of owned land was a fair measure. However, in relatively under-developed sub-regions, where the lowlands were not equally cultivated, corvée service according to where the owned lands were located would have been considered an appropriate measure. In what was called the “field-frontage system,” landlords whose lands were adjacent to the dikes would shoulder a heavier responsibility. In other words, the late-fifteenth century reform was to solve the horizontal conflicts and antagonism. The result was a set of hydraulic rules, set up through the state’s intervention, the implementation of the “field frontage system,” and supplementing by corvée based on the area of owned land. By the late sixteenth century, it would have been natural to adopt the principle of corvée based on the area of owned land, since the lands in this region, in general, were equally cultivated. However, new challenges arose from the conflicting views held by gentry-landlords and by commoners and independent peasants regarding the exemption privilege that urban gentry-landlords enjoyed. This resurfacing of the hierarchical conflicts and antagonism was eventually solved again through the state’s intervention and carrying out of reform: levying corvée service according to the area of owned land, demanding landlords to pay their tenants for doing labor service for them, and putting restrictions on the exemption privilege. This article concludes with an elaboration of how the author's argument differs from Oyama Masaaki, who emphasized the independence of tenants in the late sixteenth and early seventh centuries. The author concludes that in China, without intermediate groups and associations, the intervention of the authoritarian state was the only means by which local consolidation could be achieved and through which local cooperation could take place.

Based on a longtime study of primary sources and fieldwork in the Lower Yangzi Delta, the author discusses the longstanding problem regarding the characteristics of Chinese society from the perspective of state-society relations. In what is also a review of his own scholarship, the author points out that the Lower Yangzi Delta is a region where water resources were abundant and flooding or droughts rarely became a problem. Under these circumstances, there was no “hydraulic community,” and even a “village community” did not exist. From the ninth to the early seventeenth century, the development of dike systems varied in different sub-regions. It was nonetheless true that there was no self-organizing mechanism for cooperation or collaboration between landlords and tenants, or among peasants whose fields were located within the same area surrounded by dikes. Consequently, state intervention was needed to build a system able to solve hydraulic problems that the local population had no efficient means to handle. This is the core reason behind the three major hydraulic reforms – in the early fifteenth, late fifteenth, and late sixteenth century respectively – which took place in this region. The challenge of the late fifteenth century arose from conflicts between sub-regions that varied in regard to their development. In sub-regions where the dike system had been fully developed and the lowlands surrounded by the dikes had been equally cultivated, levying corvée service according to the area of owned land was a fair measure. However, in relatively under-developed sub-regions, where the lowlands were not equally cultivated, corvée service according to where the owned lands were located would have been considered an appropriate measure. In what was called the “field-frontage system,” landlords whose lands were adjacent to the dikes would shoulder a heavier responsibility. In other words, the late-fifteenth century reform was to solve the horizontal conflicts and antagonism. The result was a set of hydraulic rules, set up through the state’s intervention, the implementation of the “field frontage system,” and supplementing by corvée based on the area of owned land. By the late sixteenth century, it would have been natural to adopt the principle of corvée based on the area of owned land, since the lands in this region, in general, were equally cultivated. However, new challenges arose from the conflicting views held by gentry-landlords and by commoners and independent peasants regarding the exemption privilege that urban gentry-landlords enjoyed. This resurfacing of the hierarchical conflicts and antagonism was eventually solved again through the state’s intervention and carrying out of reform: levying corvée service according to the area of owned land, demanding landlords to pay their tenants for doing labor service for them, and putting restrictions on the exemption privilege. This article concludes with an elaboration of how the author's argument differs from Oyama Masaaki, who emphasized the independence of tenants in the late sixteenth and early seventh centuries. The author concludes that in China, without intermediate groups and associations, the intervention of the authoritarian state was the only means by which local consolidation could be achieved and through which local cooperation could take place.