京師戒嚴與糧餉肆應：以崇禎己巳之變為中心的討論

Forage Supplying During the Period of Martial Law: A Case Study on Ji-sih Crisis of 1629

崇禎二年十月二十六日，皇太極出兵攻明。北京城自十一月一日起戒嚴逾二個月。由於戒嚴決定來得突然，各項物資準備不及，加上明末各項稅收普遍折銀，導致戰時積貯不足，戰備物資籌措情況亦不樂觀。當時戶部提高各倉場人員管理層級、在京師各重要出入口設置管餉司官，負責各守城軍隊行糧供應及協助援軍行糧之措辦，形成一個富機動性的戰時財政供應系統。同時配合戰爭發展的需要，調整物資供應技術，透過儘量折銀減輕物資消耗壓力，將有限的資源全用以供應城外援軍，遂能達成此次戒嚴期間對北京城內外的供餉任務。從此役財政運作情況來看，明末戶部仍充分具備物資整備、行糧發放等財政運作及調度能力，與黃仁宇所謂明代戶部僅為一會計單位的印象並不相同。值得注意的是，此次戒嚴留下兩個嚴重的問題：一是戰爭中戶、兵二部的協調出現問題，戶部無法抵抗來自兵部的糧餉供應壓力，導致兵餉支出不理性的膨脹；二是因戰爭而產生的額外支出難以彌補。這兩個問題最後都成為戶部新的財政缺口，最終導致明朝的財政崩潰。 On 26 October 1629, Hung Taiji (皇太極, 1592–1643) launched an attack on the Ming Empire. Starting on the 1st of November, the imperial court declared that Bejing was under martial law, which lasted for two months. The hasty decision disrupted the arrangements of the Ministry of Revenue for military logistic supply. In the late Ming, most taxes—originally collected in kind—were converted into silver cash payments. At the outbreak of war, the government was short of both cash reserve and military logistic supplies. In response to this financial and logistic crisis, the Ministry of Revenue set up a flexible and mobile wartime contingent financial system. This contingent system involved all the military logistic depots personnel whose official ranks were raised to ensure effective coordination. Furthermore, military logistic management officials were assigned to every gate at the capital to manage the flow of supplies in and out of the capital city. The Ministry of Revenue decided to convert as much of the logistic supplies that they could into silver to minimize the consumption of defense expenditures while also supporting the army with carefully managed but limited supplies. By doing so, the Ministry of Revenue successfully accomplished it mission to mobilize sufficient material to support the war effort. Historian Ray Huang suggests that the Ministry of Revenue of the Ming Dynasty was merely an accounting unit. However, this case study tells a very different story of the performance of the ministry. The Ministry of Revenue in the late Ming was capable of mobilizing financial resources and military supplies effectively. This crisis, however, also exposed two institutional defects which contributed to the financial collapse of the Ming. Both of these defects reveal the poor coordination between the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Defense. First, Military expenditures skyrocketed due to the increasing resource demands for strengthening defense. The Ministry of Revenue was not able to curb the military’s binge spending. Secondly, the wartime expenses were too large to be paid by the regular inflow of revenue that the Ministry of Revenue could mobilize. These two factors contributed to new problems and eventually led to the financial collapse of the empire.

On 26 October 1629, Hung Taiji (皇太極, 1592–1643) launched an attack on the Ming Empire. Starting on the 1st of November, the imperial court declared that Bejing was under martial law, which lasted for two months. The hasty decision disrupted the arrangements of the Ministry of Revenue for military logistic supply. In the late Ming, most taxes—originally collected in kind—were converted into silver cash payments. At the outbreak of war, the government was short of both cash reserve and military logistic supplies. In response to this financial and logistic crisis, the Ministry of Revenue set up a flexible and mobile wartime contingent financial system. This contingent system involved all the military logistic depots personnel whose official ranks were raised to ensure effective coordination. Furthermore, military logistic management officials were assigned to every gate at the capital to manage the flow of supplies in and out of the capital city. The Ministry of Revenue decided to convert as much of the logistic supplies that they could into silver to minimize the consumption of defense expenditures while also supporting the army with carefully managed but limited supplies. By doing so, the Ministry of Revenue successfully accomplished it mission to mobilize sufficient material to support the war effort. Historian Ray Huang suggests that the Ministry of Revenue of the Ming Dynasty was merely an accounting unit. However, this case study tells a very different story of the performance of the ministry. The Ministry of Revenue in the late Ming was capable of mobilizing financial resources and military supplies effectively. This crisis, however, also exposed two institutional defects which contributed to the financial collapse of the Ming. Both of these defects reveal the poor coordination between the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Defense. First, Military expenditures skyrocketed due to the increasing resource demands for strengthening defense. The Ministry of Revenue was not able to curb the military’s binge spending. Secondly, the wartime expenses were too large to be paid by the regular inflow of revenue that the Ministry of Revenue could mobilize. These two factors contributed to new problems and eventually led to the financial collapse of the empire.