套利行為、政府執法與國際智慧財產權保護政策

Arbitrage, Enforcement and International Intellectual Property Rights Protection

本文建立一個南北國並非完全隔離的智財權保護模型，探討套利行為如何影響南北兩國智慧財產權保護政策。分析結果發現：北國將允許部分套利行為的存在，並藉由延長智財權保護時效補償研發者因套利行為而產生的損失，可以改善研發國家的社會福利。此外，全球單一智財權標準會影響套利行為存在，並無法使全球社會福利水準達到極大。 This study focuses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), examining a North/South model in which market segmentation is incomplete. We investigate the way in which the existence of arbitrage affects the incentives of the two countries to set their appropriate duration of patent protection. Our results show that the North has no incentive to completely eliminate arbitrage after patents have expired in the South, despite the fact that enforcement may be costless. The results also reveal that if the demand function for an innovation is linear, then a noncooperative game of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists between the North and the South. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a uniform universal standard for IPR protection will never achieve global Pareto efficiency when markets are not perfectly segmented.

This study focuses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), examining a North/South model in which market segmentation is incomplete. We investigate the way in which the existence of arbitrage affects the incentives of the two countries to set their appropriate duration of patent protection. Our results show that the North has no incentive to completely eliminate arbitrage after patents have expired in the South, despite the fact that enforcement may be costless. The results also reveal that if the demand function for an innovation is linear, then a noncooperative game of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists between the North and the South. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a uniform universal standard for IPR protection will never achieve global Pareto efficiency when markets are not perfectly segmented.