排放權交易與跨國聯合減量政策共同執行成效分析：獨占市場機制模擬

Simulating the Effect of Joint Policies of Emission Trading and Joint Implementation under a Monopoly Market

This paper attempts to discover the effect of emission trading and joint implementation policies on total CO2 abatement cost when they are applied simultaneously. Studies show that emission trading policy is the most cost-effective approach for reducing CO2 emissions. Joint implementation is thought to reduce abatement costs when the investing country's abatement cost is higher than that in the host country. This study concludes that joint implementation curtails the host country's domestic abatement opportunity. Therefore, when joint implementation is applied, benefits obtained by the investing country must be higher than the opportunity cost lost in the host country. Further, this study also concludes that the two policies applied simultaneously cannot effectively reduce CO2 cost in the monopoly market. Apart from this, total abatement costs for the two involved countries vary with different initial CO2 reduction commitments. 排放權交易與跨國聯合減量策略分別被視為兩種二氧化碳減量之成本有效性方法，本研究則模擬分析同時執行這兩種策略的二氧化碳減量效果，研究成果發現跨國聯合減量策略會降低被投資國自行努力進行二氧化碳減量之誘因，因為此時減量技術投資國所獲得之利益會高於被投資國所損失之機會成本。此外，在獨占市場機制下，同時執行排放權交易與跨國聯合減量策略並不能有效的達成二氧化碳減量成效，而所有參與國家之總減量成本會隨著各國最初承諾減量目標而有所不同。

排放權交易與跨國聯合減量策略分別被視為兩種二氧化碳減量之成本有效性方法，本研究則模擬分析同時執行這兩種策略的二氧化碳減量效果，研究成果發現跨國聯合減量策略會降低被投資國自行努力進行二氧化碳減量之誘因，因為此時減量技術投資國所獲得之利益會高於被投資國所損失之機會成本。此外，在獨占市場機制下，同時執行排放權交易與跨國聯合減量策略並不能有效的達成二氧化碳減量成效，而所有參與國家之總減量成本會隨著各國最初承諾減量目標而有所不同。