英文摘要 |
Raz's theory of rights based on common good tries to transcend the confrontation between Deontology and Utilitarianism so as to find a new way for the theory of rights. According to the view of rights from common good, the importance of rights is more important than the interests of the rightholder, and the rights can justify the duty of others to the rightholder, but the interests of the rightholder cannot do so. The ultimate aim of this view of rights is to point out that the value of the existence of right lies in its contribution to the common good, and the common good is the most important reason for the existence of the rights. But this theory of rights does not justify the existence of the rights of freedom availably, is unable to reveal the implications of political philosophy of rightholder-centred theories of rights, and cannot explain the mismatch between the correctness of the exercise of rights and the stringency of the protection of rights. More importantly, the relationship between the rights of freedom and the common good is very complicated. Not only are a lot of common goods conflicting, but there is not a one-way and inevitable supportive relationship between the common good and rights. The stringency of the protection of rights does not come from the common good in the abstract, but from the balance of the different common goods in conflict This provides a coherent explanation for understanding the meaning and function of 'public interest' in the 185th article of General Rules of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, and this article just shows the strength and the limitation of the common good approach. |