英文摘要 |
This is a work of comparative philosophy, in which the transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl and his followers and the author's phenomenology of pure vitality are brought together for a dialogue. The focus of comparison is on the issue of world view. The transcendental phenomenologists hold that the world is formed by the intentional function of the transcendental consciousness and is therefore devoid of independent reality. We are advised to have a correct understanding of the world and build up what E. Husserl calls “die Lebenswelt.” For the phenomenology of pure vitality, the world is nothing but the result of certain processes undergone by the pure vitality as the ultimate principle. These processes include condensation, degradation, differentiation and finally “pseudopresentation” (pratibhasa in Buddhist Sanskrit). The world thus formed is also devoid of independent reality. This is the most obvious homology on the issue of world view between the two phenomenological theories. However, there is a sharp difference. Husserl's phenomenology lacks a cosmological explication in which the concrete and cubic nature of all physical entities initiated by the abstract consciousness is unaccountable, whereas pseudopresentation in the phenomenology of pure vitality is a cosmological concept which deals with the rise, developments and changes of all physical entities. This concept also transmits the message that these entities “merely looks” concrete and cubic before our own sense perception, and that in reality they have nothing to do with the concrete and cubic nature. What we gain in sense perception does not represent reality of the world. |