跨境上市與現金持有價值之關係：以中國上市公司為例

Cross-Listing and The Value of Cash Holdings: Evidence from Chinese Cross-Listed Firms

本研究從財務限制與代理問題的角度，探討跨境上市對現金持有價值的影響。利用2006到2013年中國上市公司的資料，本研究發現，在只考慮財務限制的情況下，跨境上市公司相對於非跨境公司，其現金持有價值較低，而此一效果在有財務限制的公司比沒有財務限制的公司明顯，且非國有企業比國有企業更為明顯。另外，在只有考慮代理問題的情況下，跨境上市公司的現金持有價值比非跨境公司高，而且此效果以國有企業較明顯。最後，在同時考慮財務限制與代理問題的情況下，前者的效果比後者高。本研究的結果顯示，中國上市公司跨境上市能有效降低資訊不對稱與代理問題，因而影響其現金持有之價值，而最重要的是，財務限制改善的效果高於代理問題降低的效果，此反映了中國金融市場的特殊性。

This study investigates the effects of cross-listing on the value of cash holdings through the mitigation of financial constraints and agency problems. Using a sample of Chinese cross-listed firms from 2006 to 2013, we find that cash holdings are less valuable for financially constrained cross-listed firms than for unconstrained cross-listed firms. Moreover, the decrease of the value of cash holdings is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than for SOEs. When taking agency problems into consideration, we find that cross-listed firms have higher value of cash holdings than non-cross-listed firms and this is stronger for SOEs than for non-SOEs, consistent with the bonding hypothesis. Finally, we find that the effect of mitigating financial constraints dominates the effect of alleviating agency problems. Our results suggest that the cross-listing of Chinese firms influences the value of their cash holdings through the channels of the amelioration of information asymmetry and agency problems, with the effect of the former being stronger than that of the latter due to the unique financial system in China.