核心代理問題及盈餘管理對公司價值的影響

How do Core Agency Problem and Earnings Management Affect Firm Value?

本研究主要檢視盈餘管理、核心代理問題對公司價值的影響，本研究透過二階轉換模式建立以公司為基礎的盈餘管理指標，收集1996 年~2010 年的台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本。本研究發現公司控制股東控制權及現金流量分配權偏離程度愈高，公司盈餘管理程度愈高，且公司價值愈低。隨後在考量內生性問題後，本研究發現公司控制股東控制權及現金流量分配權偏離程度愈高，經理人愈會使用盈餘管理降低公司價值。

This research investigates the effect of earnings management and core agencyproblem on firm values. This research uses second-order transfer function to buildcompany based earning management index. The research sample covers all thelisted company in Taiwan capital market from year 1996 to 2010. The results showthat firm has higher earnings management and lower firm value when firm havehigher deviate between control rights and cash flow rights. Finally, after controlendogeneity problem, the result shows that firm with higher deviate between controlrights and cash flow rights will manipulate earnings to lower firm value.