家族企業與自願性財務預測

The Association between Founding Family Ownership and the Properties of Management Voluntary Earnings Forecasts

本研究探討家族企業與自願性財務預測的關聯性。實證結果發現，家族企業較不願意發佈自願性財務預測，可能原因為家族成員長期投資以及有效的監督可以降低其與經理人間的資訊不對稱，家族成員不需透過發佈財務預測降低其與經理人間的資訊不對稱。家族企業雖然不願發佈財務預測，但是一旦發佈，家族企業發佈的自願性財務預測品質較好，可能原因為家族企業較重視家族企業的聲譽。我們再進一步將總經理是否由家族成員擔任以及股權是否偏離將家族企業分群，實證結果發現，家族與非家族企業對於財務預測次數以及預測品質的差異主要是來自於家族成員擔任總經理的家族企業（而非專業經理人擔任總經理的家族企業）；相較於非家族企業，股權存有偏離或沒有偏離的家族企業都會發佈較少的財務預測，財務預測品質也較好。

This study investigates the association between founding family ownership andvoluntary earnings forecasts. We find that compared to non-family firms, familyfirms are less likely to make earnings forecasts. However, when family firms decideto make earnings forecasts, their forecasts are more accurate than non-family firms.Family firms also tend to decrease forecasts error and avoid issuing over optimisticforecasts. These findings are consistent with the notion that family owners have alonger investment horizon, have lower information asymmetry between owners andmanagers, and are more concerned about reputation costs. Additional analysis alsosuggests that family firms with family members being CEOs (rather than familyfirms with professional CEOs) are primarily responsible for family firms exhibitingless earnings forecasts, and more accurate earnings forecasts as compared tonon-family firms. However, compared to non-family firms, both family firms withand without voting-cash flow rights divergence provide fewer earnings forecasts,and their forecasts are more accurate.