投入要素價格契約與雙占廠商的策略性授權

Input Price Contracts and Strategic Delegation with Downstream Duopoly

本文以上游獨占供應商及下游雙占製造商為模型，來探討供應商所採行的投入要素價格契約，如何影響製造商所有權人給予其經理人的獎酬計畫。若製造商為Cournot競爭，在浮動價格契約下，要素價格的決定係在獎酬計畫的決定之後，則製造商所有權人所決定的獎酬計畫，會處罰經理人的銷貨導向行為，使其生產較少數量；在固定價格契約下，要素價格的決定係在獎酬計畫之前，則製造商所有權人會同時獎勵經理人的利潤與銷貨導向行為，使其生產較多數量，供應商的利潤也較高。本文在Bertrand競爭情況下得到類似結果，即供應商採行固定價格契約所獲得的利潤較高。

This paper examines how input price contracts by an upstream monopolist affect the incentive schemes that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. In the Cournot case, under a floating price contract in which the upstream supplier chooses the input prices after the managerial incentive schemes are made, the owners of the downstream firms compensate their managers for profits while penalizing them for sales. Conversely, a fixed price contract (where the input prices remain unchanged following the downstream delegation decisions) leads to more aggressive managerial behavior and higher market output, thereby benefiting the monopoly supplier. Similar results are obtained for the Bertrand case wherein the owners of the downstream firms direct their managers toward a more aggressive behavior under a fixed price contract than under a floating price contract. The supplier always prefers a fixed price contract to a floating price contract.