英文摘要 |
When one infers, among available explanations, that the best one is (the most likely to be) true, she is following the rule of inference to the best explanation. Such a rule, not surprisingly, is frequently followed by ordinary people in daily life, and by scientists as well in the course of research. However, objections arise as to the justifiability of the inference to the best explanation: Hungerford’s objection; Voltaire’s objection; and the argument from a bad lot. In this paper, I argue that Darwinian Inference to the Best Explanation (DIBE) can be justified: (1) I will endorse the view that, throughout Origin of Species, Darwin’s argument for the theory of natural selection, hopefully, can be characterized as an inference to the best explanation. (2) But what is special with DIBE, as I will point out, is that it adds extra requirements on what counts as the best explanation. (3) I will argue that DIBE can meet the objections against the reliability of Inference to the best explanation, and thus that it can be justified. |