懷德海論知覺與自然

Whitehead on Perception and Nature

懷德海對感官知覺之分析與其自然觀密不可分，本文之主要目的，便是要對此一關係作深入的闡釋，以期揭示懷氏自然觀之基礎及其可能的限制。在說明懷氏對同質與異質的思維方式之區分之後，我們試圖從 (1) 思想與知覺之關係、(2) 命題之結構與 (3) 懷氏是否為概念論者等三個角度，來闡明知覺與自然之種種關係。復次，我們分辨三種關於「自然之二元分裂」的理論，並顯示其中所面臨的困難，以及懷氏一己之自然觀如何能避免這些困難之威脅。最後我們指出：由於其遣詞用字之特色以及方法論之限制，懷氏一己之說亦隱含一些內在的張力與可能的難題。

Whitehead’s account of perception and his concept of nature are closely related in his well known book, The Concept of Nature (CN). The main purpose of this paper is to elucidate his concept of nature therein by (1) exposing his view on the relation between perception and thought; (2) disclosing his view on the nature and structure of proposition, and (3) answering the question of whether he can be regarded as a conceptualist. These tasks together will shed light on how nature is disclosed by sense perception and what kinds of components and mental faculties are involved in such experience. Furthermore I will discern three versions of bifurcation of nature with different degrees of strength and argue that Whitehead own concept of nature can avoid the difficulties involved in those versions. Finally I will point out that although Whitehead severely rejects some fallacies related to the classical conception of modern science, which are said to be committed by some philosophers, he himself, perhaps due to his peculiar kind of methodological considerations, seems to hold in CN a disenchanted view of nature and this causes some problems for his view on the relation between perceptual experience and nature.