英文摘要 |
“Phenomenology” as a movement has its origins in transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl asserts the primacy of transcendental reduction, and makes it a philosophical method to serve a scientific basis for all knowing. Reduction seems to focus on a reduction to objective, ”present” phenomena. People find Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness as a “metaphysics of presence”(following Heidegger, Derrida). They attack Husserl’s presentive intution is nothing but to free presence from any condition. Marion finds different insight in Husserl’s work. Phenomenology is concerned with concrete acts of meaning-intendings, not as empirically occurring facts, but they have intentional, a priori structure. Husserl proposes a categorical intuition side by side with sensory intuition. Heidegger seeks the conceptual groundwork to understand his own question of the Being of beings. He reveals that everything perceived bodily is in signification. In agreement with Heidegger, Derrida believes signification without intuition, and stresses the sign foreign to presence. For Marion, presentive intuition insists neither presence, nor being, but the primacy of givenness of phenomenon. It means that presence is pure form of the call from other. He is thus led to posit a formulation like “the more reduction, the more givenness”. |