論Darwall理性關懷福祉理論：關懷倫理學的評論

On Stephen Darwall’s Rational Care Theory of Welfare: The Critique of Care Ethics

本文將探討美國哲學家 Darwall 於《福祉與理性關懷》(2002)一書提出的理性關懷福祉理論 (Rational Care Theory of Welfare)，以及 Feldman、Hurka、Rosati 和 Raz 等學者於 2006 年提出對於 Darwall 理論的評論，並藉由檢討 Darwall 對這些學者的相關回應，說明更完整表述的理性關懷福祉理論。此外，本文也將從女性主義關懷倫理學的角度來批判與檢討Darwall 的理性關懷福祉理論。雖然理性關懷福祉理論深受女性主義關懷倫理學的影響，但是本來令人以為很切近的兩理論，經過本文細察發現，它們不但不是那麼接近，甚至還是在理論的根本預設、內容與實值應用都不相同。於是，兩種關懷理論的反差提供了彼此參考與批評的根據。而從女性主義關懷倫理學強調關懷關係優先性的理論基礎對關懷福祉理論所進行的批評，既不同於前面列舉學者所提出的評論，其評論更是貼近關懷的實質來進行。

Despite its relatively short length, Darwall’s Welfare and Rational Care contains many arguments on the relation between care and welfare, which, to name just a few, include the argument against Sidgwick’s rational-desire theory of welfare, the concept of welfare as agent-netural rather than as agent-relative, and the argument on the coherence of disagreement about welfare. All in all, Darwall argues that insofar as one cares (oneself or others), one should rationally desire (rational dictate) to promote the good of the cared for (oneself or others). Darwall’s care theory draws our attentions to the fact that one’s well-being (welfare) may not follow from one’s rational belief and desire. Instead, only care (of other and oneself) can warrant the promotion of welfare of the cared for. This paper aims at examining Darwall’s rational care theory of welfare, and would also discuss Darwall’s replies to his book comments. From Darwall’s responses to Feldman (2006), Hurka (2006), Rosati (2006) and Raz (2006), a much complete version of rational care theory of welfare has been emerging. But, could Darwall’s much improved version be prevented from the critique of feminist care ethics? To the surprise of Darwall, who has acknowledged great influence of feminist care ethics to his ethical doctrine, the answer is cearly no. Care ethicists hold the moral legitimacy of partiality towards one’s near and dear, suggest that the carer should promote the welfare of the cared for relative to his/her responding caring attitudes, disconnect the link between moral principles and normative ethics, and foremost, emphasize the priority of interpersonal relations over individual independence and autonomy. The paper concludes that the critique of feminist care ethicists on Darwall’s rational care theory would be more challenging and more radical than those published book comments.